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[Abstract: As the global financial crisis threatens to manifest in enhanced 
protectionism, the economic irrationality of dumping, countervailing, and global 
safeguard measures (so-called ‘trade remedies’) should be of increased concern to 
the Members of the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’). Long tolerated under the 
WTO agreements and perhaps a necessary evil to facilitate multilateral trade 
liberalisation, elimination of trade remedies is far from the agenda of WTO 
negotiators. However, a small number of regional trade agreements offer a model for 
reducing the use of trade remedies among WTO Members in the longer term, 
consistent with WTO rules and broader public international law.] 
I INTRODUCTION 
Current difficulties in the Doha Round of multilateral negotiations at the World Trade 
Organization (‘WTO’) are reflected in the proliferation of bilateral and plurilateral 
trade agreements according preferential treatment to individual trade partners 
(generally referred to as preferential, regional or free trade agreements (‘RTAs’)),1 as 
well as the continued use of so-called ‘trade remedies’ (anti-dumping, countervailing, 
and safeguard measures ostensibly intended to counter ‘unfair’ trade or unexpected 
increases in imports) as a tool to protect local industry. Both of these developments 
threaten to undermine the underlying objectives of the WTO, which include 
enhancing global welfare through trade liberalisation while taking into account the 
particular needs and goals of each WTO Member. This paper reflects on the 
widespread use of RTAs and trade remedies in order to provide lessons for the benefit 
of all WTO Members. In particular, it explores RTAs as positive models to reduce or 
eliminate the use of trade remedies among WTO Members, providing a concrete case 
study of the potential for ‘multilateralizing regionalism’.2  
Reducing reliance on trade remedies would diminish market distortions and enable 
fairer competition among producers across the world, bringing the WTO closer to its 
theoretical foundations (encouraging Members to specialise in areas in which they 
have a comparative advantage) and hence closer to its broader welfare objectives. 
This goal is all the more critical in the current global financial climate, when WTO 
Members worldwide appear particularly tempted to use trade remedies to protect their 
industries.3 The continued and widespread use of trade remedies by WTO Members 
has led some to conclude that ‘[t]rade remedies appear to be permanent fixtures in 
                                                 
1 In this paper, the term ‘RTA’ encompasses both ‘free-trade areas’ and ‘customs unions’ as defined 
in Article XXIV:8 of the WTO’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, as discussed further in 
section IVB(i) below. I use this term for convenience, recognising that many ‘RTAs’ are not in fact 
between geographically proximate territories. 
2 This term is taken from Richard Baldwin and Patrick Low (eds), Multilateralizing Regionalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
3 See, eg, WTO Press Release 556, ‘WTO Secretariat reports increase in new anti-dumping 
investigations’ (7 May 2009); International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, ‘WTO 
Warns of “Significant Slippage” toward Protectionism’ (2009) 13(12) Bridges Weekly Trade News 
Digest 4; WTO, World Trade Report 2009 (WTO: Geneva, 2009) 19. 
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international trade agreements’. 4  It is true that a wide range of developed and 
developing countries (well beyond the group of traditional users) are now heavily 
reliant on trade remedies, rendering impossible wholesale reform in the near future. 
However, this should not prevent thoughtful, steady progress towards the longer-term 
goal of reducing the use of trade remedies among WTO Members, in order to begin to 
bridge the gap between economic rationality and political reality regarding trade 
remedies in the WTO. It may well be too soon to propose the wholesale elimination of 
anti-dumping measures or any other form of trade remedy in the WTO, but I do not 
believe it is too late. 
Part II of this paper describes in more detail the tension that exists between WTO 
obligations and objectives on the one hand and RTAs and trade remedies on the other, 
focusing on the theoretical and practical problems created by trade remedies for the 
multilateral trading system. In doing so, it introduces the exceptions for trade 
remedies contained in the WTO’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
(‘GATT 1994’), 5  Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (‘Anti-Dumping Agreement’),6 Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (‘SCM Agreement’), 7  and Agreement on 
Safeguards (‘Safeguards Agreement’).8 It also outlines possible reforms to improve 
the current system in the longer term. Part III reviews more than 150 RTAs to 
determine the extent to which their provisions restrict or eliminate trade remedies 
among RTA partners, the corresponding implications for international trade, and the 
conditions that facilitated this result. Part IV considers whether Article 41(1) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’),9 Article XXIV of the GATT 
1994, or other WTO provisions allow or require the elimination of trade remedies in 
RTAs, or whether, conversely, they pose an obstacle to this approach and therefore 
preclude the use of RTAs as a step towards reducing the use of trade remedies among 
WTO Members more generally.  
The paper concludes that a small number of RTAs do provide realistic models for 
ultimately reducing or eliminating trade remedies across the WTO Membership. 
Eventually, WTO Members could instead respond to predatory dumping with 
competition laws, to illegal subsidies with WTO dispute settlement, and to import 
surges with safeguards pursuant to a reformed safeguard regime. In the shorter term, 
WTO provisions do not prevent RTA partners from eliminating trade remedies 
amongst themselves. 
                                                 
4 Robert Teh, Thomas Prusa and Michele Budetta, ‘Trade Remedy Provisions in Regional Trade 
Agreements’ in Antoni Estevadeordal, Kati Suominen and Robert Teh (eds), Regional Rules in the 
Global Trading System (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 166, 245. But see Robert 
McGee and Yeomin Yoon, ‘Anti-dumping rules should be consigned to the history books’, Financial 
Times (3 July 2009). 
5 LT/UR/A-1A/1/GATT/1 (signed 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995). 
6 LT/UR/A-1A/3 (signed 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995). 
7 LT/UR/A-1A/9 (signed 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995). 
8 LT/UR/A-1A/8 (signed 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995). 
9 1155 UNTS 331 (adopted 22 May 1969). 
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II THE PROBLEM, AND LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS 
A RTAs and Trade Remedies as Exceptions to Core WTO Disciplines 
(i) WTO Objectives 
The WTO seeks to achieve objectives such as ‘raising standards of living’ and 
‘ensuring full employment’ by ‘entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade 
and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations’.10 
Subject to compliance with stringent conditions, WTO rules permit both RTAs and 
trade remedies, even though they would otherwise violate core obligations or 
‘disciplines’ imposed on WTO Members in order to liberalise trade and thereby 
improve national and global welfare. Thus, trade remedies are ‘trade protection that 
you can get away with under the anti-dumping agreement’,11 the SCM Agreement, 
and the Safeguards Agreement, and RTAs reflect ‘discriminatory trade policy that you 
can get away with under Article XXIV’12 of the GATT 1994. 
(ii) RTAs as an Exception to MFN Treatment 
RTAs represent a major exception to the key pillar of non-discrimination in the WTO: 
the obligation to provide most-favoured nation (‘MFN’) treatment to each WTO 
Member. The MFN rule in the context of trade in goods means that a Member must 
provide any benefit it accords to the products of one country (whether or not that 
country is a WTO Member) to the products of all WTO Members (GATT Article I:1). 
Members’ overzealous entry into multiple RTAs in recent years has seriously 
damaged the MFN rule and the principle of non-discrimination.13 One factor that has 
allowed this explosion of RTAs has been uncertainty surrounding the WTO exception 
for RTAs,14 which arises from ambiguous drafting15 and a dearth of relevant and 
helpful WTO jurisprudence and scholarly investigation. MFN treatment has become 
the exception rather than the rule, with almost all Members providing preferential 
treatment to specific Members pursuant to a range of RTAs. This distorts international 
trade, prevents producers from competing on a level playing field, and negates the 
benefits of the MFN rule (particularly for smaller and weaker Members). However, 
RTAs may have some trade-liberalising effects and thus provide building blocks on 
                                                 
10 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LT/UR/A/2 (signed 15 April 
1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) (‘Marrakesh Agreement’) preamble. 
11 Theresa Carpenter, ‘A historical perspective on regionalism’ in Richard Baldwin and Patrick Low 
(eds), Multilateralizing Regionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 13, 14 (citing 
Michael Finger, Antidumping: How It Works and Who Gets Hurt (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1993). 
12 Theresa Carpenter, ‘A historical perspective on regionalism’ in Richard Baldwin and Patrick Low 
(eds), Multilateralizing Regionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 13, 14.  
13 See, eg, WTO Consultative Board, The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in 
the New Millennium (Geneva: WTO, 2004) ch II. See also Jagdish Bhagwati and Arvind Panagariya, 
‘Preferential Trading Areas and Multilateralism—Strangers, Friends, or Foes?’ in Jagdish Bhagwati 
and Arvind Panagariya (eds), The Economics of Preferential Trade Agreements (Washington, DC: The 
AEI Press, 1996) 1. 
14 GATT 1994, Article XXIV:5. 
15 Particularly in GATT 1994 Article XXIV:8. 
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the path to multilateral trade liberalisation.16 For this reason, Article XXIV:5 provides 
an exception for RTAs, as discussed further below.17  
This paper seeks to elucidate WTO law on RTAs and to harness the prevalence of 
RTAs to turn them from a negative to a positive force with respect to trade remedies. 
In particular, the existence of RTA partners trading amongst themselves without 
resorting to trade remedies may provide a valuable basis for learning how to reduce 
trade remedies in the WTO.  
(iii) Trade Remedies as Established Exceptions to Various WTO Rules 
Trade remedies represent a significant incursion into core WTO disciplines created to 
liberalise trade. These measures are permitted (but not required) by WTO rules. 
However, in the absence of the existing exceptions in GATT 199418 (as agreed by the 
WTO Members):  
 anti-dumping and countervailing measures (which generally take the form 
of higher tariffs/customs duties on imports of specific products from 
particular countries) would violate the MFN rule,19 because the imports on 
which they are imposed receive less favourable treatment than imports 
from other countries; 
 safeguards (which typically take the form of higher tariffs or quantitative 
restrictions such as import quotas on imports of given products) could 
violate the general WTO prohibition on quantitative restrictions;20 and  
 all three trade remedies could violate individual Members’ schedules of 
tariff bindings (ceilings above which the relevant Member has agreed not 
to impose tariffs on specific products).  
In concluding the GATT 1947, negotiators incorporated these exceptions for trade 
remedies in part because some countries (the United States (‘US’) in particular) would 
not otherwise have agreed to other aspects of liberalisation mandated by that 
agreement.21 The GATT contracting parties maintained and clarified these exceptions 
in the GATT 1994 and the related trade remedy agreements upon the creation of the 
WTO. In this sense, trade remedies are not ‘self-balancing’: ‘[t]rade-offs between 
                                                 
16 For discussion of the economic impact of RTAs, see Viet Do and William Watson, ‘Economic 
Analysis of Regional Trade Agreements’ in Lorand Bartels and Federico Ortino (eds), Regional Trade 
Agreements and the WTO Legal System (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 7-22. See also 
David Gantz, Regional Trade Agreements: Law, Policy and Practice (Durham, North Carolina: 
Carolina Academic Press, 2009) 17-25. 
17 See sections IVA and IVB. 
18 See GATT 1994, Articles II:2(b), VI:2, VI:3, XIX:1(a). 
19 On the relationship between safeguards and the MFN rule, see below section IVB(iii). 
20 GATT 1994, Article XI:1. 
21 See Michael Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (New York: 
Routledge, 3rd ed, 2005) 312-313 (citing Kenneth Dam, The GATT: Law and International Economic 
Organization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970) 99, 106); WTO, World Trade Report 2009 
(WTO: Geneva, 2009) 26-30, 39. See also the references to Sykes, below nn 27, 32. 
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remedies reform and concessions in other areas seem to be necessary’.22 In examining 
trade remedies in the WTO and RTAs, one must therefore be aware of the 
significance of trade remedies in facilitating liberalisation more generally.  
B The Trouble with Trade Remedies, and Ideas for Reform 
Most economists agree that trade remedies (or at least anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures) are almost invariably inefficient. They disadvantage not 
only producers and exporters of the products on which they are imposed but also 
importers, consumers, and industrial users of those products in the countries imposing 
them.23 These harmful effects have led to calls to remove or replace trade remedies, 
for example by replacing anti-dumping measures with competition disciplines.24 In 
the following paragraphs, I provide a more detailed description of the nature of trade 
remedies, as defined for the purpose of this paper, and their place in the WTO 
agreements in order to demonstrate their economic and political significance. At the 
outset, it is worth noting that this paper concerns anti-dumping, countervailing and 
safeguard measures in the context of trade in goods rather than services.25 
(i) Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures 
Pursuant to GATT Article VI and the Anti-Dumping Agreement, a WTO Member 
may impose anti-dumping measures on imports of a given product from another 
Member where its investigating authorities have found that the imported product is 
being ‘dumped’ and thereby causing injury to the domestic industry that produces the 
like product. Products are essentially dumped when they are sold at a lower price in 
the importing country than in the exporting country (after making adjustments for 
transport costs etc).26  
From the perspective of the importing country at least, anti-dumping measures are 
economically irrational because they are usually passed on to the consumer by 
increasing the price of the good. The higher prices paid by the consumer (or industrial 
user) in the importing country outweigh the benefits gained by the protection afforded 
to the competing domestic industry. Moreover, several legitimate commercial reasons 
exist for dumping, so dumping is not necessarily an ‘unfair’ practice for which foreign 
producers or exporters should be penalised. Anti-dumping measures may therefore 
                                                 
22 Richard Baldwin, Simon Evenett and Patrick Low, ‘Beyond tariffs: multilateralizing non-tariff 
RTA commitments’ in Richard Baldwin and Patrick Low (eds), Multilateralizing Regionalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 79, 137. 
23 See, eg, Michael Finger, Francis Ng, and Sonam Wangchuk, Antidumping as Safeguard Policy, 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2730 (Washington DC: World Bank, 2001). 
24 See, eg, Peter Lloyd, ‘Anti-Dumping and Competition Law’ in Patrick Macrory, Arthur Appleton 
and Michael Plummer (eds), The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis 
(New York: Springer, 2005) vol II, 67-82; Senator Joe Ludwig, A Fair Go for Australian Industry: 
Labor’s Policy Discussion Paper on Australia’s Anti-Dumping Administration (2006); Martyn Taylor, 
International Competition Law: A New Dimension for the WTO? (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006) ch 9. Cf Sungjoon Cho, ‘Anticompetitive Trade Remedies: How Antidumping Measures 
Obstruct Market Competition’ (2009) 87 North Carolina Law Review 357. 
25 See below nn 26, 30 and 41. 
26 GATT 1994, Articles VI:1, VI:2; Anti-Dumping Agreement, Articles 1, 2.1, 3.1, 3.5. Anti-
dumping measures apply only to trade in goods. The WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services 
LT/UR/A-1B/S/1 (signed 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) (‘GATS’) does not 
mention dumping or anti-dumping measures. 
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hinder legitimate foreign competition, to the detriment of the consumer and the 
development of the domestic industry, even if the importer or exporter absorbs them 
rather than adding them to the price of the product. Although anti-dumping measures 
may be an economically rational response to ‘predatory dumping’ (designed to wipe 
out the competition before raising the price above a competitive level), this kind of 
dumping is extremely unlikely to occur in practice. In any case, the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement does not target predatory dumping by requiring domestic investigating 
authorities to examine intent before imposing anti-dumping measures.27  
In contrast, as discussed fully elsewhere,28 competition disciplines in place of anti-
dumping measures could better focus the response to dumping on commercially 
illegitimate behaviour. However, the question of interaction between competition 
policy and international trade is currently outside the negotiating mandate of WTO 
Members, and harmonised competition laws across the WTO Membership are a long 
way off.29 Moreover, a wide range of developed and developing countries are now 
heavily reliant on anti-dumping measures: this group has expanded significantly 
beyond the traditional users. Accordingly, this model for reform does not provide a 
feasible solution for the medium to short term. 
Pursuant to GATT Article VI and the SCM Agreement, a WTO Member may impose 
countervailing measures on imports of a given product where its investigating 
authorities have determined that it is being subsidised by another Member and thereby 
causing injury to the domestic industry that produces the like product. 30  
Countervailing measures will only ever be useful where the imposing Member is 
concerned about the impact of subsidies in its own market (as opposed to the impact 
in the market of the subsidising Member or in a third country), since countervailing 
measures are typically imposed in the form of import tariffs in the domestic market.  
Like anti-dumping measures, countervailing measures are almost always welfare-
reducing in the importing country even though they may protect the competing 
                                                 
27 See Petros Mavroidis, Patrick Messerlin and Jasper Wauters, The Law and Economics of 
Contingent Protection in the WTO (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008) 7-18; Alan Sykes, ‘Comparative 
Advantage and the Normative Economics of International Trade Policy’ (1998) 1(1) Journal of 
International Economic Law 49, 80-81; Alan Sykes, ‘International Trade: Trade Remedies’ in Andrew 
Guzman and Alan Sykes (eds), Research Handbook in International Economic Law (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2007) 62, 97-101; Michael Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The Regulation of 
International Trade (New York: Routledge, 3rd ed, 2005) 250-261; Edwin Vermulst, The WTO Anti-
Dumping Agreement: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) n 7; WTO, World Trade 
Report 2009 (WTO: Geneva, 2009) xv-xvii, 65-73, 83-84. Cf Jacob Viner, Dumping: A Problem in 
International Trade (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1923, reprinted 1991 by Augustus M 
Kelley, Publishers) 120-122, 147; Gabrielle Marceau, Anti-Dumping and Anti-Trust Issues in Free-
trade Areas (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1994) 43. 
28 See above n 24 and corresponding text. 
29 WTO General Council, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WT/L/579 (2 
August 2004) [1(g)]. See also Andrew Mitchell, ‘Broadening the Vision of Trade Liberalisation: 
International Competition Law and the WTO’ (2001) 24 World Competition: Law and Economics 
Review 343. 
30 GATT 1994, Article VI:3; SCM Agreement, Articles 10, 15.1, 15.5. Countervailing measures 
apply only to trade in goods. Article XV of the GATS provides for further negotiations on subsidies in 
the services context but does not mention countervailing measures. 
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domestic industry,31 because they tend to be passed on so that the consumer pays a 
higher price for the import. Contrary to their supposed purpose, countervailing 
measures are also unlikely in practice to induce a State to change its practice or policy 
of subsidising a particular product. 32  Finally—again mirroring the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement—in allowing countervailing measures, Part V of the SCM Agreement 
does not target predatory conduct that might flow from subsidies.33 The agreement 
has in fact been described as ‘one of the least economics-informed agreements in the 
WTO’.34 
One difference between countervailing and anti-dumping measures (or, indeed, 
safeguards) is that they represent only one of two means of responding to a subsidy, 
because they target the conduct of a WTO Member rather than commercial actors. 
Although the WTO Members ‘condem[n]’ dumping that causes or threatens material 
injury to the domestic industry,35 dumping itself is not illegal under WTO rules or 
challengeable in the WTO dispute settlement system, at least in part because this 
system is restricted to resolving disputes between WTO Members, and WTO 
Members themselves do not engage in dumping. In contrast, subsidies involve a 
‘financial contribution by a government or any public body’.36 The WTO Members 
have agreed that certain subsidies are harmful and can therefore themselves constitute 
a violation of Part II (Prohibited Subsidies) or Part III (Actionable Subsidies) of the 
SCM Agreement. These violations can be challenged in the WTO dispute settlement 
system.37 
Pursuing a subsidy through the multilateral route of WTO dispute settlement is 
generally preferable to imposing countervailing measures from an economic 
perspective.38 Although some (illegal) subsidies39 could be countered with either a 
countervailing measure or a recommendation of the Dispute Settlement Body,40 the 
                                                 
31 See Gary Horlick and Debra Steger, ‘Subsidies and Countervailing Duties’ in Peter Morici (ed), 
Making Free Trade Work: The Canada―U.S. Agreement (New York: Council on Foreign Relations 
Press, 1990) 84, 86. 
32 See Alan Sykes, ‘International Trade: Trade Remedies’ in Andrew Guzman and Alan Sykes (eds), 
Research Handbook in International Economic Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007) 62, 106-109; 
Alan Sykes, ‘Subsidies and Countervailing Measures’ in Patrick Macrory, Arthur Appleton and 
Michael Plummer (eds), The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis (New 
York: Springer, 2005) vol II, 83, 84, 103-105. 
33 Michael Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (New York: 
Routledge, 3rd ed, 2005) 283. 
34 Petros Mavroidis, Patrick Messerlin and Jasper Wauters, The Law and Economics of Contingent 
Protection in the WTO (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008) 462. Cf WTO, World Trade Report 2009 
(WTO: Geneva, 2009) xvii-xviii, 88-95, 101-102. 
35 GATT, Article VI:1. 
36 SCM Agreement, Article 1.1(a)(1). 
37 SCM Agreement, Article 30. 
38 Alan Sykes, ‘Subsidies and Countervailing Measures’ in Patrick Macrory, Arthur Appleton and 
Michael Plummer (eds), The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis (New 
York: Springer, 2005) vol II, 83, 104-105. 
39 In particular, an injurious subsidy could fall under Article 5(a) of the SCM Agreement in a WTO 
dispute settlement proceeding, and satisfy the requirements of Article 10 of the SCM Agreement in a 
countervailing duty investigation. An injurious subsidy could also be prohibited under Article 3 of the 
SCM Agreement or contrary to Articles 5(b) (nullification or impairment) or 5(c) (serious prejudice) of 
the SCM Agreement, all of which violations could be addressed in WTO dispute settlement.  
40 Footnote 35 to the SCM Agreement allows for a Member to pursue both avenues at the same time 
(countervailing duty investigation under Part V and dispute settlement pursuant to Parts II or III), but 
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former is a unilateral remedy imposed following a domestic proceeding of a WTO 
Member. This domestic countervailing duty investigation must be conducted in 
accordance with multilateral rules in the WTO (as reflected in the relevant Member’s 
own laws and regulations), but the domestic producers still get the benefit of the 
countervailing measures even if the investigation is not conducted in accordance with 
WTO rules, at least until another Member brings a successful WTO dispute 
challenging the conduct of the investigation. Accordingly, in the longer term, 
countervailing duties may be successfully eliminated in the WTO while retaining the 
possibility of challenging illegal subsidies in the WTO dispute settlement system 
(recognising that that system itself is imperfect and that negotiations continue on its 
reform). 
(ii) Safeguards 
Pursuant to GATT Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement, a WTO Member may 
impose a safeguard where its competent authorities have found in an investigation 
increased imports of a given product that have arisen from unforeseen developments 
and are injuring domestic producers of like or directly competitive products.41 Other 
forms of safeguards exist in the WTO but are not the subject of this paper.42 The so-
called ‘global’ safeguards available under GATT Article XIX should also be 
distinguished from the ‘bilateral’ safeguards provided for in many RTAs, as discussed 
below.43 
Unlike anti-dumping and countervailing measures, global safeguards do not target 
allegedly unfair trading practices. Rather, they are intended to provide a ‘safety valve’ 
or ‘escape clause’ 44  for WTO Members whose domestic industries are facing a 
sudden flood of imports, and they provide a means for Members to deal with the 
‘adjustment costs’ of trade liberalisation in an orderly manner. In theory, they may 
therefore play a particularly significant role in enabling WTO Members to agree to 
open their markets.45 Also in contrast to anti-dumping and countervailing measures, 
safeguards are a temporary response to an emergency and they must generally be 
                                                                                                                                            
only one remedy may be obtained (countervailing measures, or countermeasures following a successful 
WTO dispute). 
41 GATT 1994, Article XIX:1(a); Safeguards Agreement, Articles 1, 2.1, 4.2. Safeguards apply only 
to trade in goods. Article X of the GATS provides for further negotiations on ‘the question of 
emergency safeguard measures’ in the context of services.  
42 For example, specific safeguards arise under: GATT Article XII (to address balance of payments 
difficulties); Article 5 of the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture LT/UR/A-1A/2 (signed 15 April 1994, 
entered into force 1 January 1995); and Section 16 of the Protocol on the Accession of the People’s 
Republic of China, annexed to WTO Ministerial Conference, Decision of 10 November 2001 on 
Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432 (23 November 2001) 9-10. 
43 See section IIIA(ii). 
44 See, eg, Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger, ‘Enforcement, Private Political Pressure and the 
GATT/WTO Escape Clause’ (2005) 34 Journal of Legal Studies 471; Alan Sykes, ‘Protectionism as a 
Safeguard: A Positive Analysis of the GATT Escape Clause with Normative Speculations’ (1991) 58 
University of Chicago Law Review 255. 
45 Patrick Messerlin and Hilda Fridh, ‘The Agreement on Safeguards Proposals for Change in the 
Light of the EC Steel Safeguards’ (2006) 40(4) Journal of World Trade 713, 715-716; Alan Sykes, 
‘The Persistent Puzzles of Safeguards: Lessons from the Steel Dispute’ (2004) 7(3) Journal of 
International Economic Law 523, 524-525. Cf Chad Bown and Meredith Crowley, ‘Safeguards’ in 
Patrick Macrory, Arthur Appleton and Michael Plummer (eds), The World Trade Organization: Legal, 
Economic and Political Analysis (New York: Springer, 2005) 43, 53-54. 
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imposed on an MFN basis (ie on imports of the relevant product from all countries).46 
The Member imposing them must also generally provide compensation to other 
affected Members who have engaged in consultations on the matter, in order to ensure 
that its overall level of WTO commitments is 47 unchanged.  
                                                
These additional conditions on the use of safeguards typically make them preferable, 
from an economic perspective, to anti-dumping and countervailing measures. 48  
However, perhaps in part because of these additional conditions (and the strict way in 
which the WTO Appellate Body has interpreted the Safeguards Agreement), Members 
in fact use safeguards far less frequently than anti-dumping or countervailing 
measures.49 Safeguards also still raise economic concerns in that, for example, they 
may encourage lobbying of governments by domestic industries in the hope of long-
term protection rather than the temporary protection intended,50  and they tend to 
‘delay the contraction’ of declining or uncompetitive industries. 51  In addition, 
safeguards are central to the ambiguity surrounding the relationship between trade 
remedies and RTAs in the WTO. In particular, no authoritative decision or judgment 
exists as to whether WTO Members are allowed or required to exclude RTA partners 
from the application of safeguards, as discussed further below.52  
Finally, safeguards suffer from a loophole in connection with the WTO dispute 
settlement system. A Member imposing a safeguard on the basis of an absolute 
increase in imports need not provide compensation to affected exporting Members for 
the first three years,53 and a safeguard found to be imposed contrary to WTO rules 
will not need to be remedied until the end of the reasonable period of time for 
compliance (which may be 15 months or more from the date of adoption of the 
relevant Panel and Appellate Body Reports),54 and then only on a prospective basis. 
Before that time, a violation may be maintained without being subject to retaliation in 
the form of suspension of concessions by the complaining Member. Although this 
feature is characteristic of WTO dispute settlement generally, it is of particular 
concern in the context of safeguards, because these are intended as emergency 
 
46 Safeguards Agreement, Articles 7.1, 7.2, 2.2 (but see exceptions in Articles 5.2 and 9); Panel 
Report, Argentina – Footwear (EC), [8.84]. See the discussion in section IVB(iii) below concerning 
Article 2.2 of the Safeguards Agreement. 
47 Safeguards Agreement, Articles 8, 12.3. 
48 Chad Bown, ‘Why are Safeguards Under the WTO So Unpopular?’ (2002) 1 World Trade Review 
47, 50-51. See also WTO, World Trade Report 2009 (WTO: Geneva, 2009) xv, 47-49. 
49 Chad Bown, ‘Why are Safeguards Under the WTO So Unpopular?’ (2002) 1 World Trade Review 
47, 47-48; Petros Mavroidis, Patrick Messerlin and Jasper Wauters, The Law and Economics of 
Contingent Protection in the WTO (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008) 465; Chad Bown and Meredith 
Crowley, ‘Safeguards’ in Patrick Macrory, Arthur Appleton and Michael Plummer (eds), The World 
Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis (New York: Springer, 2005) 43, 57, 61; 
WTO, World Trade Report 2009 (WTO: Geneva, 2009) xx. 
50 Petros Mavroidis, Patrick Messerlin and Jasper Wauters, The Law and Economics of Contingent 
Protection in the WTO (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008) 475. 
51 Alan Sykes, ‘International Trade: Trade Remedies’ in Andrew Guzman and Alan Sykes (eds), 
Research Handbook in International Economic Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007) 62, 75. See 
also Michael Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (New York: 
Routledge, 3rd ed, 2005) 313-314. 
52 See part IVB(iii). 
53 Safeguards Agreement, Article 8.3. 
54 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, LT/UR/A-
2/DS/U/1 (signed 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) (‘DSU’), Article 21.3(c). 
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measures imposed only on a temporary basis anyway. By the time the dispute 
settlement process is complete, the safeguards may have already been in place for a 
significant portion of the usual four-year period,55 with the result that the domestic 
industry gets ‘free’ protection for that temporary period regardless of whether the 
safeguards comply with WTO rules.56 
If anti-dumping and countervailing measures are to be ultimately eliminated in the 
WTO, itself a controversial position, then Members may need to retain the ability to 
impose safeguards in order to provide a safety net and so prevent a reversal of the 
liberalisation gains that have been made over the last half century. However, the quirk 
of WTO dispute settlement should be remedied so that Members cannot maintain 
illegal safeguards for several years without consequence. These changes would likely 
render the use of safeguards even more unpopular, but it is crucial if trade remedies 
are to be restricted to legitimate purposes and no longer used as protectionist devices. 
Furthermore, it could be countered by other changes designed to make safeguards 
practically workable. As highlighted above, safeguards are intended as ‘adjustment 
policies in order to become competitive, avoid a social or political crisis, and provide 
political room for the acceptance by the people of the rest of the WTO rules’, but the 
Appellate Body’s current jurisprudence makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
for Members to impose safeguards consistently with WTO rules.57 Specifically, for 
reasons ably explained elsewhere, the Appellate Body’s invented ‘parallelism’ 
requirement58 should be abolished,59 and its stringent conditions concerning matters 
such as ‘unforeseen developments’60  and ‘non-attribution’61   revised. As detailed 
below,62 Members should also be reassured that they are entitled to exclude RTA 
partners from global safeguards, subject to certain conditions.  
                                                 
55 Safeguards Agreement, Article 7.1. 
56 See, eg, Appellate Body Report, US – Steel Safeguards; ‘Sparks fly over steel’, The Economist, 15 
November 2003, Vol 369, Iss 8350, p 78; Office of the Press Secretary, White House, ‘Statement by 
the President’ (Press Release, 4 December 2003). 
57 Olivier Prost and Erwan Berthelot, ‘Agreement on Safeguards, Article 2’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum, 
Peter-Tobias Stoll and Michael Koebele (eds), Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law 
Volume 4: WTO – Trade Remedies (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 264, 286; see also Alan Sykes, 
‘The Persistent Puzzles of Safeguards: Lessons from the Steel Dispute’ (2004) 7(3) Journal of 
International Economic Law 523, 524, 563; Alan Sykes, ‘The Fundamental Deficiencies of the 
Agreement on Safeguards: A Reply to Professor Lee’ (2006) 40(5) Journal of World Trade 979, 979-
980. 
58 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Footwear (EC), [111]-[112]; Appellate Body Report, US – 
Line Pipe, [181]; Appellate Body Report, US – Steel Safeguards, [448]-[453]; Appellate Body Report, 
US – Wheat Gluten, [96]. 
59 Joost Pauwelyn, ‘The Puzzle of WTO Safeguards and Regional Trade Agreements’ (2004) 7(1) 
Journal of International Economic Law 109, 119-124. 
60 Yong-Shik Lee, ‘Not Without a Clue: Commentary on “the Persistent Puzzles of Safeguards”’ 
(2006) 40(2) Journal of World Trade 385, 390. Cf Alan Sykes, ‘The Fundamental Deficiencies of the 
Agreement on Safeguards: A Reply to Professor Lee’ (2006) 40(5) Journal of World Trade 979, 993-
994. 
61 Alan Sykes, ‘The Fundamental Deficiencies of the Agreement on Safeguards: A Reply to 
Professor Lee’ (2006) 40(5) Journal of World Trade 979, 984-985. 
62 See section IVB(iii). 
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(iii) Impact of the Global Financial Crisis 
As foreshadowed in the introduction above, 63  the problem of trade remedies is 
exacerbated whenever countries face difficult economic circumstances, because the 
pressure for protection of domestic industries intensifies. 64  The current global 
financial climate may thus multiply the rates of applications for and imposition of 
anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard measures. Indeed, although it may be too 
early to assess the full effects of the global financial crisis, it does appear to be having 
some impact on the imposition of trade remedies.  
Based on Members’ reports, the WTO Secretariat identified a 28% increase in the 
number of new anti-dumping investigations in 2008 compared to 2007, and a 29% 
increase in the number of new anti-dumping measures during the same period.65 Also 
based on Members’ reports, the number of countervailing investigations exhibited a 
27% increase from 2007 and 2008, while the number of countervailing measures 
imposed shot from 2 in 2007 to 11 in 2008: an increase of 450%.66 A joint report 
issued under the responsibility of Pascal Lamy (Director-General of the WTO), Angel 
Gurría (Secretary-General of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (‘OECD’)) and Supachai Panitchpakdi (Secretary-General of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (‘UNCTAD’) and former WTO 
Director-General) indicates that the number of new safeguard investigations by G20 
countries has increased considerably from 2 in the first half of 2008 to 16 in the first 
half of 2009.67 Finally, Chad Bown’s Global Antidumping Database reveals an 18.8% 
increase in the initiation of anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard investigations 
in the first quarter of 2009 compared to the first quarter of 2008, a 12.1% increase in 
the second quarter of 2009 compared to the second quarter of 2008, and a 52.6% 
increase in the third quarter of 2009 compared to the third quarter of 2008.68 These 
increases may be one example of the ‘murky protectionism’ that some commentators 
                                                 
63 See above n 3 and corresponding text. 
64 See WTO, World Trade Report 2009 (WTO: Geneva, 2009) xxi, xxiii. 
65 WTO Press Release 556, ‘WTO Secretariat reports increase in new anti-dumping investigations’ (7 
May 2009); AD Initiations: By Reporting Member From: 01/01/95 To: 31/12/08, at < www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/adp_e/ad_init_rep_member_e.pdf>, last accessed 22 October 2009; AD Measures: By 
Reporting Member From: 01/01/95 To: 31/12/08, at <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/ 
ad_meas_rep_member_e.pdf>, last accessed 22 October 2009.  
66 CV Initiations: By Reporting Member From: 01/01/95 To: 31/12/08, at <www.wto.org/english 
/tratop_e/scm_e/cvd_init_rep_member_e.pdf>, last accessed 7 June 2009; CV Measures: By Reporting 
Member From: 01/01/95 To: 31/12/08, at < www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/cvd_meas_rep_ 
member_e.pdf>, last accessed 7 June 2009. 
67 WTO–OECD–UNCTAD, Report on G20 Trade and Investment Measures (14 September 2009) 12. 
68 Chad Bown, ‘Protectionism Increases and Spreads: Global Use of Trade Remedies Rises by 18.8% in 
First Quarter 2009’, A Monitoring Update to the Global Antidumping Database (11 May 2009) 1; Chad 
Bown, ‘Protectionism Continues its Climb: Spike in “Safeguard” Use is Major Contributor to 12.1% 
Global Increase in Industry Demands for New Import Restrictions during Second Quarter of 2009’, A 
Monitoring Update to the Global Antidumping Database (23 July 2009) 1; Chad Bown, ‘The Pattern of 
Antidumping and Other Types of Contingent Protection’, PREMnotes Number 144 (October 2009) 1. 
These statistics include China-specific safeguards (see note 42 and corresponding text above). See also 
Chad Bown, ‘Protectionism is on the rise: antidumping investigations’ in Richard Baldwin and Simon 
Evenett (eds), The collapse of global trade, murky protectionism, and the crisis: Recommendations for 
the G20 (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2009) 55. 
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fear is developing as a result of the crisis,69 rendering all the more important the quest 
to combat trade remedies.  
III RTAS AS MODELS FOR REDUCING TRADE REMEDIES? 
This part details and explores RTAs that include commitments by the parties not to 
impose trade remedies on each other. Commitments of this kind represent an 
improvement on existing WTO rules from an economic perspective, and they suggest 
that practical and political obstacles to reducing the use of trade remedies are not 
insurmountable. Although the vast majority of RTAs maintain the WTO exceptions 
allowing trade remedies, some adopt an alternative approach. Below, I first survey the 
general RTA response to trade remedies, which is to maintain WTO trade remedy 
provisions with no or only minor modifications. I describe these as ‘WTO-equivalent’ 
RTAs. I then turn to examine in more detail a number of RTAs that provide more 
substantial modifications to WTO rules, reducing the application of anti-dumping, 
countervailing or safeguard measures between RTA partners or limiting their 
degree.70 These are ‘WTO-plus’ RTAs in the sense that they represent more stringent 
commitments to liberalise trade between the parties than apply generally between 
WTO Members under the GATT 1994 and its associated trade remedy agreements. 
However, as discussed further below, these RTAs will not necessarily lead to greater 
trade liberalisation or less trade distortion at a global level. 
A WTO-Equivalent RTAs 
As already stated, most RTAs do not vary the general WTO rights to impose trade 
remedies, or they modify these rights in only a minor way. Annex 1 below 
summarises 118 RTAs that fall within this description. 
(i) Category 1: No Changes to WTO Rules 
The 25 RTAs listed in Category 1 of Annex 1 make no mention of WTO anti-
dumping, countervailing, or safeguard measures (thus leaving the WTO rules 
unmodified, and maintaining rights to impose trade remedies in accordance with those 
rules) or make no significant changes to the WTO trade remedy provisions under 
examination in this paper. Category 1 therefore contains the most ‘WTO-equivalent’ 
of the RTAs reviewed. However, most of these agreements concern the 12 members 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan—many of which are not yet WTO Members.71 
                                                 
69 Richard Baldwin and Simon Evenett (eds), The collapse of global trade, murky protectionism, and 
the crisis: Recommendations for the G20 (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2009). See 
also WTO, World Trade Report 2009 (WTO: Geneva, 2009) 160. 
70 For earlier WTO analysis of RTA trade remedy provisions, see WTO Committee on Regional 
Trade Agreements, Inventory of Non-Tariff Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: Background 
Note by the Secretariat, WT/REG/W/26 (5 May 1998) 15-22. 
71 At the time of writing, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are not WTO Members, although all of these apart from Turkmenistan 
are recognised as observer governments in the WTO and are in the process of accession to the WTO: 
see <www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acc_e.htm> and < www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e 
/tif_e/org6_e.htm>, last accessed 8 June 2009. For further discussion of integration in this region, see 
Sherzod Shadikhodjaev, ‘Trade Integration in the CIS Region: A Thorny Path Towards a Customs 
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Some of the RTAs in Category 1 contain procedural modifications to the WTO rules. 
For example, the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement between the European 
Communities and Egypt72 requires consultations before imposing safeguard measures 
under the WTO agreements, 73  and the Melanesian Spearhead Group Trade 
Agreement 74  requires consultations before imposing either anti-dumping or 
countervailing measures.75 
(ii) Category 2: Introduction of Bilateral Safeguards 
The 28 RTAs listed in Category 2 of Annex 1 either do not mention anti-dumping or 
countervailing measures or explicitly preserve the parties’ existing rights to impose 
these measures under WTO rules or domestic legislation. For example, Article 6.2.1 
of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (‘Trans-Pacific 
SEP’), between Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand (‘NZ’), and Singapore,76 
states: 
Nothing in this Agreement affects the rights and obligations of the Parties under Article VI 
of GATT 1994, the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 1994 which is part of the WTO Agreement (Antidumping Agreement) 
and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures which is part of the WTO 
Agreement (SCM Agreement) with regard to the application of antidumping and 
countervailing duties or any amendments or provisions that supplement or replace them. 
 
The Category 2 RTAs all provide additional rules on bilateral safeguards (that is, 
safeguards applied between RTA partners as opposed to global safeguards applied to 
all WTO Members in accordance with GATT Article XIX and the Safeguards 
Agreement). These bilateral safeguards are sometimes described as ‘tariff snapbacks’, 
because they involve reversion to MFN tariff rates in particular circumstances. 
Sometimes bilateral safeguards are allowed for a transitional period only and 
sometimes only in relation to specific products or for specific purposes. For instance, 
Article 6.1.1 of the Trans-Pacific SEP preserves the parties’ WTO rights under GATT 
Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement, and a separate chapter allows Chile to 
apply a ‘special safeguard measure to a limited number of specified sensitive 
agricultural goods’ where the quantity of imports of the relevant good exceeds a 
particular ‘quantity trigger level’.77 These kinds of RTAs, in allowing the imposition 
of global as well as bilateral safeguards, have the potential to increase the use of 
‘trade remedies’, broadly defined, among WTO Members. Although some of the 
agreements specify that global and bilateral safeguards cannot both be applied in the 
                                                                                                                                            
Union’ (2009) Journal of International Economic Law (advance access version published online 22 
May 2009). 
72 Signed 25 June 2001, entered into force 1 June 2004. 
73 Article 24. 
74 Signed 22 July 1993, entered into force 22 July 1993. 
75 Article 14. 
76 Signed by New Zealand, Chile and Singapore on 18 July 2005 and by Brunei Darussalam on 2 
August 2005; entered into force for New Zealand and Singapore on 1 May 2006, for Chile on 8 
November 2006, and for Brunei Darussalam on a provisional basis on 12 June 2006. 
77 Trans-Pacific SEP, Articles 3.13.1, 3.13.5. See n 41 above regarding WTO safeguards relating to 
agriculture. See also OECD, ‘Regional Trading Arrangements and the Multilateral Trading System: 
Agriculture’, OECD Trade Policy Working Papers No 15 (OECD: Paris, 2005) 8-9.   
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same instance, 78  these kinds of RTAs do not provide much of a model in 
demonstrating how to reduce the use of trade remedies in the WTO. 
(iii) Category 3: Procedural Modifications and Bilateral Safeguards 
The 66 RTAs listed in Category 3 of Annex 1 make procedural changes to the 
application of WTO trade remedies and also provide additional rules regarding the 
application of bilateral safeguards. As with the procedural changes mentioned above 
in relation to Category 1, these RTAs generally provide for consultations before 
applying trade remedies. Other procedural changes in these RTAs include enhanced 
notification requirements before applying trade remedies. 79  Lee explains how the 
Republic of Korea largely failed in its attempts to have similar procedural and more 
substantive requirements included in the United States – Korea Free Trade 
Agreement 80  in respect of anti-dumping and countervailing measures. 81  Although 
these additional procedural hurdles may encourage RTA partners to reach a mutually 
agreed solution rather than imposing trade remedies, these are fairly soft obligations 
and do not assure that result.  
B WTO-Plus RTAs 
In this section I examine RTAs that substantively modify the WTO rules on trade 
remedies by restricting or eliminating their use in particular circumstances. Annex 2 
lists 32 RTAs that exclude the application of anti-dumping, countervailing and/or 
safeguard measures as between RTA partners, with some RTAs appearing in more 
than one column because they limit more than one type of trade remedy.  
(i) Eliminating Anti-Dumping Measures 
The first column of Annex 2 contains eight RTAs that abolish anti-dumping measures 
between RTA partners. One positive case study is the Australia New Zealand Closer 
Economic Relations Trade Agreement (‘ANZCER’),82 which was signed in 1983 and 
amended in 1988 by the Protocol to the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic 
Relations–Trade Agreement on Acceleration of Free Trade in Goods (‘ANZ 
Protocol’),83 under which the parties agree to eliminate anti-dumping measures on 
goods originating in each other’s territory.84 Interestingly, this agreement allows the 
parties to continue to impose countervailing measures on each other’s imports, but 
                                                 
78 See, eg, Agreement on Trade in Goods under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 
Economic Cooperation Among the Governments of the Member Countries of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (‘ASEAN’) and the Republic of Korea (signed 24 August 2006), Article 9.10. 
Similarly, Article 5.8 of the Agreement on Agriculture precludes recourse to both the special safeguard 
under that agreement and global safeguards under Article XIX of the GATT 1994. See above n 42 and 
corresponding text. 
79 See, eg, ASEAN Protocol on Notification Procedures (signed 8 October 1998), Article 1. 
80 Signed 30 June 2007. 
81 Yong-Shik Lee, ‘The Beginning of Economic Integration Between East Asia and North America? 
– Forming the Third Largest Free Trade Area Between the United States and the Republic of Korea’ 
(2007) 41(5) Journal of World Trade 1091, 1112-1113. 
82 Signed 28 March 1983, deemed to have entered into force 1 January 1983. 
83 Signed 18 August 1988, entered into force 18 August 1988. 
84 Article 4. 
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only ‘when no mutually acceptable alternative course of action has been determined 
by the Member States’.85 
In certain European and Chinese agreements,86 abolition of anti-dumping measures is 
similarly associated with deep integration (characterised by ‘harmonized or common 
behind-the-border measures’, ‘arrangements that allow for free or freer movement of 
capital and labour’, ‘monetary union or the adoption of a single currency’, or political 
integration).87 However, RTAs with a lower level of integration have also managed to 
abolish anti-dumping measures, 88  often linking the abolition directly with the 
implementation or harmonisation of effective competition rules. For example, under 
the Free Trade Agreement between the [European Free Trade Association (‘EFTA’)] 
States and the Republic of Chile:89  
1. A Party shall not apply anti-dumping measures as provided for under the WTO 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 in relation to goods of 
a Party’. 
2. The Parties recognise that the effective implementation of competition rules may 
address economic causes leading to dumping.90 
De Araujo, Macario and Steinfatt conclude that the degree of integration is a more 
important factor in allowing for the abolition of anti-dumping measures in RTAs than 
is the creation of a common competition policy or competition rules to replace anti-
dumping at the international level, noting that these different regulatory policies have 
different objectives. In contrast, they explain the RTA between Canada and Chile91 as 
involving the replacement of anti-dumping with bilateral safeguard measures. 92  
Hoekman and others reach a similar conclusion.93 If correct, this is a positive sign, 
                                                 
85 Article 16.1(c). 
86 Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement between China and Hong Kong, China (signed 29 
June 2003, entered into force 1 January 2004), Article 7; Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement 
between China and Macao, China, (signed 17 October 2003, entered into force 1 January 2004), 
Article 7; Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community [2006] OJ C 321 
E/1 (‘EC Treaty’), Articles 23, 25; Consolidated Version of the Convention Establishing the European 
Free Trade Association (signed 21 June 2001, entered into force 1 June 2002) (‘EFTA’), Article 36; cf 
Agreement on the European Economic Area (signed 2 May 1992, entered into force 1 January 1994) 
(‘EEA’), Article 26 (anti-dumping measures abolished in most sectors, pursuant to Protocol 13). 
87 Robert Teh, Thomas Prusa and Michele Budetta, ‘Trade Remedy Provisions in Regional Trade 
Agreements’, WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2007-03 (WTO: Geneva, 2007) 28-29. 
88 See, eg, Free Trade Agreement between Canada and Chile (signed 5 December 1996, entered into 
force 5 July 1997), Article M-01. 
89 Signed 26 June 2003, entered into force 1 December 2004.  
90 Article 18. See also Free Trade Agreement between the EFTA States and Singapore (signed 26 
June 2002, entered into force 1 January 2003), Article 16. 
91 Free Trade Agreement between Canada and Chile (signed 5 December 1996, entered into force 5 
July 1997), Article M-01. 
92 José de Araujo, Carlo Macario and Karsten Steinfatt, ‘Antidumping in the Americas’ (2001) 35(4) 
Journal of World Trade 555, 568-570. See also José Rivas-Campo and Rafael Benke, ‘FTAA 
Negotiations: Short Overview’ (2003) 6(3) Journal of International Economic Law 661, 672. 
93 Bernard Hoekman, ‘Competition Policy and Preferential Trade Agreements’, World Bank Working 
Paper (World Bank: Washington DC, 2002) 14; Bernard Hoekman, ‘Free Trade and Deep Integration: 
Antidumping and Antitrust in Regional Agreements, Policy Research Working Paper (World Bank: 
Washington DC, 1998) 31; Robert Teh, Thomas Prusa and Michele Budetta, ‘Trade Remedy 
Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements’, WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2007-03 (WTO: Geneva, 
2007) 27-29. 
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since it means that agreement on competition rules at the multilateral level is not 
necessarily a precondition to the abolition of anti-dumping measures among WTO 
Members. Progress on the competition front would certainly not hinder the goal of 
abolishing anti-dumping, but, as already noted, neither of these issues is currently on 
the WTO agenda.94  Agreement on competition policy beyond national borders is 
difficult. In the context of the ANZCER, Taylor concludes that ‘[t]he success of 
replacing anti-dumping laws with competition law … appears to be linked with the 
high degree of similarity in business practices, legal systems and existing competition 
law, along with similar social, economic and cultural backgrounds’. 95  Gradual 
liberalisation within an RTA over an extended period of time may also allow the 
industries in the partners’ markets to adjust and become more closely integrated, 
facilitating harmonisation of competition law and policy. 
One concern about restricting anti-dumping measures between RTA parties is that 
non-parties will suffer greater discrimination with respect to anti-dumping or be 
subject to more anti-dumping measures by those parties, distorting and restricting 
international trade.96 Teh, Prusa and Budetta express this concern, after determining 
that 56 in a survey of 74 RTAs either abolish anti-dumping measures or contain 
specific anti-dumping provisions.97 The assumption that WTO Members ‘need’ to 
engage in a certain degree of protectionism and that this will manifest in the form of 
anti-dumping measures against imports from one country or another could be valid. 
However, little empirical evidence exists to support the authors’ hypothesis regarding 
the impact on non-RTA parties of restricting intra-RTA anti-dumping measures, and 
further economic and statistical analysis is required to assess this conclusion.  
Moreover, Members do not impose anti-dumping duties on an MFN basis anyway; 
nor do the WTO rules require them to do so. Rather, a Member imposing these duties 
in respect of a given product following an anti-dumping investigation must simply do 
so ‘on a non-discriminatory basis on imports of such product from all sources found to 
be dumped and causing injury’,98 except for imports from sources that have provided 
undertakings to revise their prices in accordance with Article 8 of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement. An anti-dumping investigation is initiated upon an application by or on 
behalf of the domestic industry or (more rarely) by the investigating authorities 
themselves, in both cases subject to the existence of sufficient evidence of dumping, 
                                                 
94 See WTO, Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, 
WT/L/579 (2 August 2004) [1(g)] (removing competition from the Doha Work Programme). See also 
above n 24. 
95 Martyn Taylor, International Competition Law: A New Dimension for the WTO? (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006) 274-276.  
96 See, eg, Dukgeun Ahn, ‘Foe or Friend of GATT Article XXIV: Diversity in Trade Remedy Rules’ 
(2008) 11(1) Journal of International Economic Law 107, 125-126; Matthew Schaefer, ‘Ensuring that 
Regional Trade Agreements Complement the WTO System: US Unilateralism a Supplement to WTO 
Initiatives?’ (2007) 10(3) Journal of International Economic Law 585, 590. 
97 Robert Teh, Thomas Prusa and Michele Budetta, ‘Trade Remedy Provisions in Regional Trade 
Agreements’, WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2007-03 (WTO: Geneva, 2007) 21. The authors find 
nine RTAs that abolish anti-dumping (including the EEA) and 47 with specific anti-dumping 
provisions (see 18-19). The authors reach a similar conclusion in Robert Teh, Thomas Prusa and 
Michele Budetta, ‘Trade Remedy Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements’ in Antoni Estevadeordal, 
Kati Suominen and Robert Teh (eds), Regional Rules in the Global Trading System (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009) 166, 174-175. 
98 Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 9.2 (emphasis added). 
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injury and causal link to justify the initiation of an investigation.99  The domestic 
industry may choose to target imports from particular countries and not others, in 
applying to the investigating authorities to commence an anti-dumping investigation. 
Similarly, Members with particular historical, political or economic ties may choose 
not to subject each other’s imports to anti-dumping investigations, whether or not they 
have an RTA obligation to refrain from doing so (indeed, with the exception of the 
EC, the RTAs identified in column 1 of Annex 2 appeared to have little impact on the 
actual rate of anti-dumping investigations initiated or measures imposed with respect 
to RTA partners – that is, these partners were not frequent targets anyway). An RTA 
obligation would of course entrench this approach, removing the discretion of 
Members to decide from one case to the next whether to investigate imports from 
specific countries. Nevertheless, given the economic difficulties with anti-dumping 
measures highlighted earlier, without further investigation, this concern provides an 
insufficient basis on which to discourage RTAs that abolish anti-dumping measures or 
discount their potential value as a precedent in reducing anti-dumping measures on a 
broader scale. 
(ii) Eliminating Countervailing Measures 
The second column of Annex 2 contains the only four RTAs 100  that abolish 
countervailing measures between RTA partners. This is somewhat surprising, given 
that, as noted above, WTO Members can challenge prohibited or actionable subsidies 
in the WTO dispute settlement system. It seems that this additional ‘multilateral’ 
avenue for obtaining a remedy is insufficient to encourage Members to forego the 
‘unilateral’ avenue of countervailing measures, in the absence of a high degree of 
economic integration or a common approach to subsidies or ‘state aid’.101 Teh, Prusa 
and Budetta speculate that Members may be reluctant to commit to reduce subsidies 
in RTAs because all WTO Members will reap benefit from this commitment, and so 
RTA partners are correspondingly reluctant to agree to eliminate countervailing 
measures.102 
Any concerns about RTA abolition of countervailing duties leading to increased 
countervailing duties with respect to non-RTA WTO Members (that is, WTO 
Members not party to the relevant RTA) is subject to the considerations outlined 
above in relation to anti-dumping: in particular, countervailing duties are not imposed 
on an MFN basis against imports of the relevant product from all sources. Article 19.3 
                                                 
99 Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 5.1, 5.2, 5.6. 
100 Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement between China and Hong Kong, China (signed 29 
June 2003, entered into force 1 January 2004), Article 8; Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement 
between China and Macao, China, (signed 17 October 2003, entered into force 1 January 2004), 
Article 8; EC Treaty, Articles 23, 25; EFTA, Article 16.2; cf EEA, Article 26 (countervailing measures 
abolished in most sectors, pursuant to Protocol 13). 
101 Cf Robert Teh, Thomas Prusa and Michele Budetta, ‘Trade Remedy Provisions in Regional Trade 
Agreements’, WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2007-03 (WTO: Geneva, 2007) 22 (linking this trend 
to a reluctance to reduce or eliminate subsidies as part of an RTA); David Gantz, Regional Trade 
Agreements: Law, Policy and Practice (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2009) 323 
(suggesting that the absence of common subsidy policy weakens the argument for eliminating 
countervailing measures in RTAs).  
102 Robert Teh, Thomas Prusa and Michele Budetta, ‘Trade Remedy Provisions in Regional Trade 
Agreements’ in Antoni Estevadeordal, Kati Suominen and Robert Teh (eds), Regional Rules in the 
Global Trading System (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 166, 207. 
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of the SCM Agreement merely requires that Members imposing countervailing duties 
in respect of any given product do so ‘on a non-discriminatory basis on imports of 
such product from all sources found to be subsidized and causing injury’,103 except 
for imports subject to undertakings in accordance with Article 18 of the SCM 
Agreement. If a Member does not subject imports from a particular exporting country 
to a countervailing duty investigation, it need not (and cannot) impose countervailing 
duties on those imports. This means that, even in the absence of an RTA, Members 
are free to decide which Members to target in a countervailing duty investigation and 
which to exclude. Thus, an RTA obligation to shield RTA partners from 
countervailing duties will not necessarily increase the application of countervailing 
duties to imports of other countries. 
(iii) Eliminating Safeguards 
The third column of Annex 2 lists 30 RTAs that allow or require RTA partners to 
exclude the products of other RTA partners from the application of global safeguards 
pursuant to GATT Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement, on certain conditions. 
A number of these RTAs allow RTA partners to impose bilateral safeguards as 
between themselves, and/or modify the WTO rules regarding anti-dumping or 
countervailing measures, including by imposing the ‘lesser-duty rule’ in anti-dumping 
proceedings or raising the de minimis dumping margin from 2% to 5%.104  Some 
RTAs not included in the Annexes contain similar substantive modifications to WTO 
anti-dumping rules.105 Other RTAs that are being negotiated or have not yet entered 
into force contemplate restricting the application of global safeguards to RTA partners 
while allowing bilateral safeguards.106 
As an example of how RTA partners restrict the availability of global safeguards as 
between themselves, the North American Free Trade Agreement (‘NAFTA’), 107  
between Canada, Mexico and the US, provides: 
Any Party taking an emergency action under Article XIX or any such agreement shall 
exclude imports of a good from each other Party from the action unless: 
                                                 
103 Emphasis added. 
104 See, eg, Singapore – Australia Free Trade Agreement (signed 17 February 2003, entered into force 
28 July 2003), Article 8.2(b); Agreement between the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
and the Government of the Republic of Singapore on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area (signed 
16 May 2004, entered into force 22 August 2005), Article 2.8.1(a). Cf Anti-Dumping Agreement, 
Articles 5.8, 9.1. Under these provisions, Members’ authorities must terminate anti-dumping 
investigations when the dumping margin is de minimis, ie less than 2 per cent expressed as a percentage 
of the export price, and Members may impose an anti-dumping duty up to the amount of the dumping 
margin. Applying the ‘lesser duty rule’, which is recognised as ‘desirable’ but not required under the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement, means imposing an anti-dumping duty only to the extent necessary to 
remove injury to the domestic industry, where that can be achieved without imposing a duty at the level 
of the full margin of dumping. 
105 See, eg, Agreement between the EFTA States and the Republic of Korea (signed 15 December 
2005, entered into force 1 September 2006), Article 2.10.1; Free Trade Agreement between Korea and 
Singapore (signed 4 August 2005, entered into force 1 March 2006), Article 6.2.3. 
106 See, eg, Government of Peru, Ministry of Foreign Commerce and Tourism, Executive Summary: 
Peru – EFTA Free Trade Agreement, Second Round of Negotiations in Lima, Peru (27 to 31 August 
2007) 39; Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Colombia and the EFTA States (signed 25 
November 2008), Articles 2.17-2.18. 
107 Signed 17 December 1992, entered into force 1 January 1994. 
 
20 TANIA VOON 
(a) imports from a Party, considered individually, account for a substantial share of total 
imports; and 
(b)  imports from a Party, considered individually, or in exceptional circumstances 
imports from Parties considered collectively, contribute importantly to the serious 
injury, or threat thereof, caused by imports.108 
 
NAFTA also provides for bilateral safeguards for a transitional period,109 as well as 
independent bi-national panels to assess final determinations in anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty cases against domestic laws 110  (a compromise flowing from 
Canada’s unsuccessful attempt to have anti-dumping measures eliminated from the 
earlier Canada – United States Free Trade Agreement).111 
The parties to the New Zealand – China Free Trade Agreement112 (the first developed 
country RTA with China) agree that, when imposing safeguard measures pursuant to 
GATT Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement, they ‘may exclude imports of an 
originating good from the other Party from the action if such imports are non-
injurious’.113 The parties to this RTA otherwise ‘maintain their rights and obligations’ 
under Articles VI and XIX of GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement, SCM 
Agreement and Safeguards Agreement,114 although they also agree not to take any 
anti-dumping action ‘in an arbitrary or protectionist manner’.115 
According to Baldwin, Evenett and Low, RTAs under which ‘parties have agreed to 
exempt other parties from any global safeguards that they impose under the respective 
WTO agreement’ provide ‘an example of exactly the opposite of multilateralizing 
regionalism, with RTAs undermining an established non-discriminatory multilateral 
norm’.116 This conclusion assumes, of course, that the WTO rules allow Members to 
impose global safeguards only on a non-discriminatory basis, an issue discussed 
further below.117 However, if RTAs can constitute an exception to the MFN rule in 
relation to safeguards under WTO law, then RTAs that allow the exclusion of RTA 
products from a global safeguard do not alter this position, and even RTAs that 
                                                 
108 Article 802.1 (emphasis added). 
109 Article 801. 
110 Chapter 19, Article 1904. See generally Bruce Blonigen, ‘The Effects of NAFTA on Antidumping 
and Countervailing Duty Activity’ (2005) 19(3) The World Bank Economic Review 407; Gustavo 
Vega-Canovas, ‘Disciplining Anti-Dumping in North America: Is NAFTA Chapter Nineteen Serving 
its Purpose?’ (1997) 14 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 479; Gilbert Winham 
and Heather Grant, ‘Antidumping and Countervailing Duties in Regional Trade Agreements: Canada-
US FTA, NAFTA and Beyond’ (1994) 3 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 1. See also Michael Hart, 
Decision at Midnight: Inside the Canada-US Free-Trade Negotiations (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994) 
388. 
111 Michael Hart, ‘Introduction’ in Michael Hart (ed), Finding Middle Ground: Reforming the 
Antidumping Laws in North America (Ottawa, Centre for Trade Policy and Law, 1997) 1, 7. 
112 Free Trade Agreement Between The Government of New Zealand And The Government of the 
People’s Republic of China, signed 7 April 2008, entered into force 1 October 2008. 
113 Article 64.1 (emphasis added). 
114 Article 61.1. 
115 Article 62.1. 
116 Richard Baldwin, Simon Evenett and Patrick Low, ‘Beyond tariffs: multilateralizing non-tariff 
RTA commitments’ in Richard Baldwin and Patrick Low (eds), Multilateralizing Regionalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 79, 120. 
117 See section IVB(iii). 
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require such exclusion simply remove Members’ discretion in imposing safeguards 
(but these RTAs will still need to comply with Article XXIV:5 of the GATT 1994).118  
Nevertheless, regardless of the WTO requirements, the practical impact of allowing or 
requiring Members to exclude imports of RTA partners from the application of a 
global safeguard deserves further empirical and economic investigation. In one study, 
Bown and McCulloch concluded that ‘country exemptions for PTA members and 
small developing-country suppliers have a discriminatory impact of redistributing 
import market shares toward these suppliers, at least on average, at the expense of 
other exporting countries’.119 However, the overall impact of excluding RTA partners 
from global safeguards is likely to differ depending on whether the relevant RTA 
provides for RTA partners to impose bilateral safeguards on each other’s products. All 
other things being equal, an RTA that precludes a party from imposing bilateral or 
global safeguards on other RTA parties will be less restrictive of intra-RTA trade than 
an RTA that allows for bilateral but not global safeguards between RTA parties, even 
if neither RTA affects the parties’ rights to impose global safeguards on other WTO 
Members. On the other hand, an RTA that prohibits bilateral and global safeguards 
may increase trade diversion away from non-RTA WTO Members, distorting 
international trade. 
As indicated in Annex 2, only five of the RTAs surveyed exclude both bilateral and 
global safeguards as between the parties.120 This kind of arrangement is generally 
associated with deeper integration, as in the European Communities (‘EC’), 121  
MERCOSUR (the Mercado Común del Cono Sur between Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay),122 and ANZCER.123 However, Singapore’s RTAs with both 
Australia and NZ demonstrate that this level of liberalisation is possible even in the 
absence of full or deep economic integration,124 providing a useful bilateral lesson for 
the multilateral stage.  
C Initial Conclusions 
Annex 2 reveals only one RTA—the Treaty Establishing the EC—that has abolished 
all three forms of trade remedies among its members: anti-dumping, countervailing, 
and safeguard measures. The number of RTAs excluding either anti-dumping, 
countervailing, or bilateral and global safeguard measures is also very low (eleven in 
total), suggesting that the general reluctance across the WTO Membership to 
                                                 
118 See below section IVB(ii). 
119 Chad Bown and Rachel McCulloch, ‘Nondiscrimination and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards’ 
(2003) 2(3) World Trade Review 327, 347. See also 343-345. 
120 These RTAs sometimes retain provisions for emergency measures to address balance of payment 
difficulties. See n 41 above regarding WTO balance of payments safeguards. 
121 EC Treaty, Articles 3.1(a), 23, 25, 28. 
122 MERCOSUR Free Trade Agreement (signed 26 March 1991, entered into force 29 November 
1991), Annex IV, Article 5. Anti-dumping and countervailing measures are allowed within 
MERCOSUR: MERCOSUR Council, Decision 22/02, Defensa Comercial Intrazona (6 December 
2002). 
123 ANZ Protocol, Articles 1.1, 2.1 (eliminating tariffs, tariff quotas and quantitative import 
restrictions from 1 July 1990). 
124 Singapore – Australia Free Trade Agreement (signed 17 February 2003, entered into force 28 July 
2003), Article 9; Agreement between New Zealand and Singapore on a Closer Economic Partnership 
(signed 14 November 2000, entered into force 1 January 2001), Article 9. 
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contemplate excluding these measures is reflected in RTAs across the globe. This 
highlights the difficulty in achieving agreement to eliminate trade remedies, even at a 
plurilateral level, as well as the different considerations applicable to each of the three 
forms, and the significance of broader and deeper integration in eliminating trade 
remedies. Thus, an advanced degree of intra-RTA trade liberalisation may be 
necessary before RTA partners will agree to remove trade remedies. Before that 
degree of liberalisation is achieved, trade remedies appear to play an important role in 
enabling liberalisation. In other words, RTA partners cannot typically agree on 
liberalisation beyond MFN levels without having trade remedies to fall back on. The 
common feature of bilateral safeguards (included in all Annex I Categories 2 and 3 
RTAs, and most Annex II RTAs) demonstrates the significance of safeguards in 
particular in facilitating liberalisation, confirming the continued need for global 
safeguards in the WTO, albeit subject to a reformed regime as outlined above.125 In 
the next section, I examine another significant reason that may be fueling Members’ 
reluctance to remove trade remedies in RTAs: uncertainty regarding the WTO-
consistency of such an approach. 
IV LEGALITY OF RTAS RESTRICTING TRADE REMEDIES 
In this section, I assess the legality of RTAs that restrict the use of trade remedies 
among RTA partners. In particular, do the WTO agreements prohibit RTA partners 
from applying trade remedies against each other or, conversely, do they permit or 
require RTA partners to do so? Put differently, are RTA provisions that preclude the 
application of trade remedies among RTA partners mandatory, permissible or 
prohibited under WTO rules? If WTO rules permit or require these provisions, RTAs 
may provide a useful framework for reducing trade remedies and a path towards trade 
remedy reduction in the WTO more broadly. As a preliminary step, I consider 
whether RTA partners are entitled to modify the WTO agreements amongst 
themselves (to restrict the use of trade remedies or otherwise) as a matter of public 
international law. I then turn to the implications of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 
for RTAs that restrict the application of safeguards among RTA partners. Safeguards 
provide the most complicated circumstances when it comes to restricting trade 
remedies in RTAs, due to the MFN rule reflected in Article 2.2 of the Agreement on 
Safeguards. I then turn to consider the implications of GATT Article XXIV for RTAs 
that restrict the application of anti-dumping or countervailing measures among RTA 
partners. Finally, I assess whether the Decision on Differential and More Favourable 
Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries 126  
(‘Enabling Clause’) affects these questions for RTAs among developing country 
Members. 
A Legality of Inter Se Modifications to the WTO Agreements 
If WTO Members are not entitled to make inter se modifications to the WTO 
agreements at all (that is, modifications amongst some Members only), then an RTA 
that removed parties’ rights to impose trade remedies pursuant to WTO rules might 
amount to a prohibited modification, even if this particular modification would not 
otherwise violate individual WTO rules. Accordingly, it is worth considering first 
                                                 
125 See section IIB(ii). 
126 L/4903, BISD 26S/203 (28 November 1979). 
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whether inter se modifications are allowed in the WTO, before turning to the specific 
modification of removing trade remedy rights in RTAs.  
(i) Applicability of Article 41(1) of the VCLT in the WTO 
As a general matter, the question whether groups of WTO Members may make inter 
se modifications to the WTO agreements remains undetermined. Article 41(1) of the 
VCLT provides guidance on when inter se modifications are allowed. Article 41(1) 
provides: 
Two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty may conclude an 
agreement to modify the treaty as between themselves alone if: 
(a) the possibility of such a modification is provided for by the treaty; 
or  
(b) the modification in question is not prohibited by the treaty and: 
(i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their 
rights under the treaty or the performance of their obligations; 
(ii) does not relate to a provision, derogation from which is 
incompatible with the effective execution of the object and 
purpose of the treaty as a whole. 
Panels and the Appellate Body have long recognised the interpretative provisions of 
Articles 31 to 33 of the VCLT as codifying or declaring customary international law. 
These provisions are therefore widely accepted as crucial in interpreting WTO 
agreements127 in accordance with Article 3.2 of the WTO’s Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the ‘Dispute Settlement 
Understanding’ or ‘DSU’),128 which indicates that one purpose of the WTO dispute 
settlement system is to ‘clarify the existing provisions of [the WTO] agreements in 
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law’.  
As Article 41(1) is not concerned with interpretation, it falls outside the description in 
Article 3.2 of the DSU, and the Appellate Body has not included Article 41(1) in this 
characterisation of the VCLT as customary. Nevertheless, Article 41(1) has been 
recognised outside the WTO as constituting customary international law,129  along 
                                                 
127 See, eg, Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, 16-17; Appellate Body Report, EC – Computer 
Equipment, [84]; Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, [200]; Appellate Body Report, India – 
Patents (US), [46]; Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, 10; Appellate Body 
Report, US – Carbon Steel, [61]; Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, [59]; Panel 
Report, Chile – Price Band System, [7.76]; Panel Report, US – Gambling, [6.9]; Panel Report, China – 
Auto Parts, [7.165]; Panel Report, China – Intellectual Property Rights, [7.249], n 244. See also 
Michael Lennard, ‘Navigating by the Stars: Interpreting the WTO Agreements’ (2002) 5(1) Journal of 
International Economic Law 17, 18–19; WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in 
the Centre William Rappard 25 September 1997, WT/DSB/M/37 (4 November 1997) 15 (statement by 
the EC); WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 
16 January 1998, WT/DSB/M/40 (18 February 1998) 3, 8 (statement by India); WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 23 May 1997, 
WT/DSB/M/33 (25 June 1997) 10 (statement by the USA); WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of 
Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 23 October 2002, WT/DSB/M/134 (29 January 2003) 
[48] (statement by Mexico). 
128 LT/UR/A-2/DS/U/1 (signed 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995). 
129 See, eg, Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to 
Other Rules of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 305; Joel 
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with most if not all of the VCLT.130  Accordingly, leading commentators such as 
Martti Koskenniemi and Joost Pauwelyn have concluded that Article 41 applies to the 
WTO agreements,131 and the Panel in Turkey – Textiles relied on Article 41(1)(b)(i) in 
reaching a conclusion on a customs union.132 
Moreover, a number of other WTO dispute settlement decisions have applied 
provisions of the VCLT apart from Articles 31 to 33. For example, Arbitrators in 
proceedings under Article 22.6 of the DSU have relied on Articles 30, 60 and 70 of 
the VCLT.133 The Appellate Body in Brazil – Desiccated Coconut and Canada – 
Patent Term and the Panel in EC – Sardines referred to Article 28 of the VCLT on 
‘Non-retroactivity of treaties’ as a ‘general principle of international law’ and applied 
it on that basis.134 The Appellate Body has also recognised the ‘principle of good 
faith’ reflected in Article 26 of the VCLT. 135  Similarly, the Panel in Korea – 
Government Procurement described Article 26 of the VCLT as expressing the 
‘principle of pacta sunt servanda’, falling with the ‘general principles of customary 
international law’.136 The same Panel applied Article 48 of the VCLT (on error in a 
treaty) on the basis that it represented customary international law.137  
The language used by Panels and the Appellate Body regarding various VCLT 
provisions has not always been consistent, but whether these provisions reflect 
‘general principles of law’ within the meaning of Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, or rules or principles of ‘customary international law’ 
pursuant to Article 38(1)(b) of that Statute, Panels and the Appellate Body have been 
ready to apply them. Although the Appellate Body in EC – Sardines relied on the 
‘interpretation principle codified in Article 28 of the VCLT’,138 it arguably applied 
Article 28 rather than merely using it as an interpretative rule. 
The Panel in Korea – Procurement went even further than other WTO dispute 
settlement reports, stating that the relationship between the WTO agreements and 
                                                                                                                                            
Trachtman, ‘Review of Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO 
Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law’ (2004) 98 American Journal of International Law 
855, 859. 
130 See, eg, Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) (Merits) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, [46], [99]; 
Anthony Aust, ‘Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969)’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law online edition at <www.mpepil.com>, last visited 28 
August 2009, [15]-[16]; Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2nd ed, 1984) 14. 
131 See, eg, Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to 
Other Rules of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 475; International 
Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification 
and Expansion of International Law – Report of the Study Group – Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, 
A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006) [306]. 
132 Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, [9.181]-[9.182]. 
133 Decision by the Arbitrators, EC – Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), [51]; Decision by the 
Arbitrators, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), [3.10]. 
134 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Desiccated Coconut, 15; Appellate Body Report, Canada – 
Patent Term, [71]; Panel Report, EC – Sardines, [7.56]. See also Appellate Body Report, EC – 
Hormones, [128]. 
135 Appellate Body Report, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), [296]-[297]. 
136 Panel Report, Korea – Procurement, [7.93].  
137 Panel Report, Korea – Procurement, [7.123]. 
138 Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, [200]. 
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customary international law was broader than that expressed in Article 3.2 of the DSU. 
Specifically, ‘[c]ustomary international law … applies to the extent that the WTO 
treaty agreements do not “contract out” from it’.139 This statement goes beyond what 
the Appellate Body has acknowledged with respect to the relationship between the 
WTO and public international law more generally.140 However, based on the evidence 
provided above, it is much less controversial to suggest that the VCLT’s role in the 
WTO is not limited to guiding interpretation pursuant to Article 3.2 of the DSU. On 
this basis, I conclude that Article 41 does apply to the WTO agreements, except to the 
extent that specific WTO provisions indicate otherwise. 
(ii) Effect of Articles X and IX of the Marrakesh Agreement 
Joel Trachtman maintains that the WTO provisions on amendment and waiver 
(Articles X and IX of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization (‘Marrakesh Agreement’) 141  respectively) ‘are best understood as 
contracting out of any possible permission for inter se modification’ pursuant to the 
VCLT and that, in any case, they amount to a prohibition on inter se modifications 
pursuant to Article 41(1)(b).142 
The WTO provisions on amendment and waiver do impose specific conditions on 
certain agreements that are essentially inter se modifications. For example, most 
amendments, if approved by consensus or the requisite majority of Members pursuant 
to Article X of the Marrakesh Agreement, would take effect only for those Members 
that have accepted them.143 These amendments are therefore inter se modifications of 
WTO rules between those Members that have accepted them. The Protocol Amending 
the TRIPS Agreement, if accepted by two-thirds of the WTO membership, would be 
an example of such an amendment, in accordance with Article X:3 of the Marrakesh 
Agreement.144 Similarly, the Ministerial Conference may decide by a three-fourths 
majority under Article IX:3 of the Marrakesh Agreement to waive an obligation 
imposed on a Member, effectively allowing that Member to modify the WTO rules as 
between itself and the rest of the WTO, without modifying the rules as between all 
WTO Members. For instance, in 2006, the General Council extended until 2012 the 
waiver of MFN and other WTO obligations with respect to measures taken by certain 
Members to prohibit the import or export of rough diamonds to non-Participants in the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.145 
                                                 
139 Panel Report, Korea – Procurement, [7.96]. 
140 See generally Andrew Mitchell, Legal Principles in WTO Disputes (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008); Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO 
Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); 
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141 LT/UR/A/2 (signed 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995).  
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143 Marrakesh Agreement, Article X:1, X:3, X:5. 
144 WTO General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement: Decision of 6 December 2005, 
WT/L/641 (8 December 2005) [3]. 
145 WTO General Council, Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds: Decision of 
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To the extent that Articles X and IX of the Marrakesh Agreement allow for inter se 
modification, they may be seen as providing more detailed rules than Article 41 of the 
VCLT and therefore prevailing over it. However, Articles X and IX of the Marrakesh 
Agreement are not in fact specifically directed at inter se modifications, in the sense 
of groups of WTO Members seeking to modify the WTO agreements as between 
themselves. Rather, Article X is directed at proposals to amend the WTO agreements 
as a whole (for all Members), even though in some cases an amendment would apply 
only to those Members who had accepted it. Similarly, Article IX is directed at 
requests for waivers by individual Members, even though in some cases a number of 
Members may make a request at the same time and in relation to the same 
circumstances. These provisions do not clearly exclude the possibility of Article 41 of 
the VCLT playing a role in relation to other kinds of inter se modifications, and so 
may be properly regarded as falling within the terms of Article 41(a): they simply 
provide one means for WTO Members to achieve inter se modifications. 
In determining the implications of Article 41 of the VCLT for inter se modifications 
not governed by Articles IX and X of the Marrakesh Agreement, the particular 
circumstances surrounding the modification in question must be examined. In the 
context of RTAs, inter se modifications are specifically contemplated in Article 
XXIV of the GATT 1994, as discussed further below. This confirms the conclusion 
that Articles IX and X of the Marrakesh Agreement do not ‘cover the field’ with 
respect to inter se modifications. 
(iii) Implications of Article 41(1) of the VCLT for RTAs 
Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 confirms that Members may enter RTAs modifying 
their WTO obligations, subject to the conditions laid out in that provision and the rest 
of the WTO agreements. Specifically, Article XXIV:5 states that ‘the provisions of 
this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories of Members, the formation 
of a customs union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of an interim agreement 
necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area’,146 subject to 
certain conditions.147 A free-trade area or customs union will necessarily reduce the 
‘duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce’ applicable between the 
parties,148  thereby prohibiting certain trade barriers that may be otherwise permitted 
under the WTO agreements, and so modifying the WTO agreements between RTA 
partners. Thus, Article XXIV at once provides an exception to the MFN rule (as 
between RTA partners and other WTO Members) and implicitly authorises inter se 
modifications (as between RTA partners). 
Modifications in RTAs pursuant to Article XXIV may therefore fall within Article 
41(1)(a) of the VCLT. This is apparently the conclusion reached by Koskenniemi for 
the International Law Commission’s Study Group on Fragmentation, as well as 
Thomas Cottier and Marina Foltea, and James Mathis,149 with the result that the WTO 
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147 See below section IVB(ii). 
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rules alone govern modifications in RTAs, leaving no scope for Article 41(1)(b) of the 
VCLT with respect to RTAs. In contrast, Pauwelyn states that the WTO rules prohibit 
inter se agreements to liberalise trade among WTO Members unless they are extended 
on an MFN basis to all Members or they comply with the conditions in Article XXIV 
of the GATT 1994 (or the corresponding Article V of the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (‘GATS’)). Pauwelyn’s approach also appears to leave no room for 
Article 41(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the VCLT with respect to RTAs, because he regards 
RTAs that do not comply with Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 as prohibited within 
the meaning of the ‘chapeau’ of Article 41(1)(b).150 
However, RTAs are not necessarily entirely trade liberalising or trade restrictive (to 
use Pauwelyn’s distinction), 151  and many modifications to WTO rules that arise 
within RTAs are not expressly addressed in Article XXIV of the GATT 1994, or in 
other WTO provisions. In these circumstances, it is simplistic to suggest that the RTA 
as a whole either falls within Article 41(1)(a) or is prohibited under the chapeau of 
Article 41(1)(b). If a particular modification in an RTA is neither ‘provided for’ nor 
‘prohibited by’ a treaty, the remaining conditions in Article 41(1)(b) become relevant. 
For instance, I have elsewhere argued that certain modifications in ‘TRIPS-Plus’ 
RTAs that limit flexibilities in relation to public health are contrary to Article 
41(1)(b)(i) and (ii).152 Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and the WTO’s Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (‘TRIPS Agreement’)153 do not 
specify whether these kinds of modifications are allowed. Similarly, Article XXIV of 
the GATT 1994 and the DSU do not indicate explicitly whether WTO Members are 
entitled to modify dispute settlement procedures in RTAs, for example by including a 
choice of forum clause preventing resort to the WTO dispute settlement system in 
certain circumstances. This issue is likely to arise in a recent complaint brought by 
Mexico against the United States regarding tuna products,154 and Article 41(1)(b) of 
the VCLT may assist in resolving it. 
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In order, then, to determine whether an RTA that restricts the application of trade 
remedies among RTA partners violates WTO law or public international law more 
generally, we must examine Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 in more detail. As we 
shall see, Article XXIV neither clearly provides for nor clearly prohibits such a 
modification, suggesting that the modification must meet the conditions of Article 
41(1)(b)(i) of the VCLT (not affecting third party rights or obligations under the WTO 
agreements) and Article 41(1)(b)(ii) of the VCLT (not relating to a provision from 
which derogation is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and 
purpose of the WTO agreements as a whole). These conditions lend weight to the 
purpose of RTAs under Article XXIV, and to the importance of maximising intra-
trade liberalisation while minimising trade distortion and diversion with respect to 
WTO Members outside the RTA. Put differently, the VCLT Article 41(1)(b) 
conditions are reflected in Articles XXIV:4 and XXIV:8 of the GATT 1994, as 
discussed further below. 
B Compliance with GATT Article XXIV 
(i) Article XXIV:8 – Lowering Intra-RTA Barriers 
Article XXIV:8 of the GATT 1994 defines a ‘free-trade area’ and a ‘customs union’, 
both of which fall within the scope of an ‘RTA’ for the purposes of this paper.155 
These definitions make clear that RTAs are allowed under WTO rules because of their 
potential to act as stepping stones towards greater multilateral trade liberalisation. 
Accordingly, significant intra-RTA trade liberalisation is required to qualify as an 
RTA, and derogation from this requirement could well be ‘incompatible with the 
effective execution of the object and purpose’ of the WTO agreements as a whole.156  
This reading is consistent with the purpose of the RTA exception as expressed in 
Article XXIV:4: ‘The Members recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of 
trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration 
between the economies of the countries parties to such agreements …’.157  
Article XXIV:8(b) defines a ‘free-trade area’ as: 
A group of two or more customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive 
regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, 
XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent 
territories in products originating in such territories. 
Similarly, Article XXIV:8(a) defines a ‘customs union’ as the:  
substitution of a single customs territory for two or more customs territories, so that: 
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those 
permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated with respect to 
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories of the union or at least with 
respect to substantially all the trade in products originating in such territories … 
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In addition, under Article XXIV:8(a)(ii), the members of a customs union must 
generally apply ‘substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce … 
to the trade of territories not included in the union’. This second limb of the definition 
of a customs union may be relevant when members of a customs union apply trade 
remedies to non-union members but does not affect the central question of this paper, 
which concerns application by RTA partners of trade remedies among themselves. 
Article XXIV:8 of the GATT 1994 has to date been inadequately illuminated in WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings and academic commentary. Greater certainty about the 
definition of ‘free-trade areas’ and ‘customs unions’ under this provision, specifically 
as regards the interaction between RTAs and trade remedies, could assist in 
encouraging existing RTA partners to amend their agreements and future RTA 
partners to abolish trade remedies amongst themselves. Below, I examine Article 
XXIV:8 in more detail in relation to the different forms of trade remedy that could be 
excluded in an RTA. 
(ii) Article XXIV:5 – Restricting Impact on Non-RTA Members 
An RTA that meets the definition of a ‘free-trade area’ or ‘customs union in Article 
XXIV:8 of the GATT 1994 must also fulfil certain other conditions in order to benefit 
from the exemption in Article XXIV:5. These conditions demonstrate that RTAs must 
not on the whole lead to greater restrictions on external trade (that is, trade with non-
RTA WTO Members); this would ‘affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their 
rights under the treaty or the performance of their obligations’.158 Again, this principle 
is reflected in Article XXIV:4, under which the Members ‘recognize that the purpose 
of a customs union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade between the 
constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other Members with such 
territories’.159 The Appellate Body has recognised Article XXIV:4 as setting forth ‘the 
overriding and pervasive purpose for Article XXIV’.160 
The Article XXIV:5 conditions include: 
(a) with respect to a customs union, … the duties and other regulations of commerce 
imposed at the institution of any such union … in respect of trade with Members not 
parties to such union … shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the 
general incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent 
territories prior to the formation of such union …; 
(b) with respect to a free-trade area, … the duties and other regulations of commerce 
maintained in each of the constituent territories and applicable at the formation of such 
free-trade area … to the trade of Members not included in such area or not parties to such 
agreement shall not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding duties and other 
regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent territories prior to the formation 
of the free-trade area … 
I have already discussed the implications of excluding RTA partners from anti-
dumping and countervailing measures above, challenging assumptions that this will 
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necessarily increase the application of these measures to WTO Members not party to 
the relevant RTA or otherwise increase trade distortion. 161  I further explore the 
meaning of Article XXIV:5 in the context of specific trade remedies below. 
(iii) Eliminating Safeguards 
In assessing the WTO-consistency of RTAs that exclude the application of global 
safeguards among their members, we must bear in mind the underlying purposes and 
detailed conditions of Article XXIV:8 and Article XXIV:5 of the GATT 1994. In 
addition, as noted above, unlike in the context of anti-dumping and countervailing 
measures, Article 2.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards stipulates that ‘Safeguard 
measures shall be applied to a product being imported irrespective of its source’. In 
other words, safeguard measures must prima facie be applied on an MFN basis.162  
Views on the exclusion of RTA partners from global safeguards generally take three 
forms: 163 (i) RTA partners must impose global safeguards on each other’s imports;164 
(ii) RTA partners must not impose global safeguards on each other’s imports;165 and 
(iii) RTA partners may impose global safeguards on each other’s imports.166 The text 
of the WTO agreements does not clearly correspond to any of these approaches, 
which is why this is such a difficult issue.167 The Appellate Body has to date avoided 
resolving it in the abstract,168 addressing the parallelism requirement169 rather than 
GATT Article XXIV in disputes concerning the application of safeguards to RTA 
partners. 
Beginning with the first approach, on its face, the language in parentheses in Article 
XXIV:8 suggests an exhaustive list, meaning that any measure that constitutes a duty 
or other restrictive regulation of commerce (‘ORRC’) and that is not mentioned in 
parentheses is included in the requirement to eliminate duties and ORRC on 
substantially all trade. 170  As Article XIX is not mentioned in the parentheses in 
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Article XXIV:8, and as safeguards under Article XIX take the form of increased 
duties or quantitative restrictions that may be described as ORRC,171 this means that 
RTA partners cannot be required to impose safeguards on each other’s products. On 
the contrary, when taken as a whole together with all other duties and ORRC, 
safeguards should be eliminated on substantially all the relevant trade. Thus, the Panel 
in Argentina – Footwear (EC) stated: ‘There is also no doubt in our minds that the 
letter and spirit of Article XXIV:8 of GATT permit member States of a customs union 
to agree on the elimination of the possibility to impose safeguard measures between 
the constituent territories’.172 
 1994).  
                                                
How does this interpretation of Article XXIV:8 of the GATT 1994 (and the allowance 
under Article XXIV:5 for RTAs as defined in Article XXIV:8) sit with Article 2.2 of 
the Agreement on Safeguards? Any conflict between Article XXIV:5 of the GATT 
1994 and Article 2.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards would ordinarily be resolved in 
favour of the latter, 173  such that RTA partners would have to impose global 
safeguards on each other’s imports. However, rather than viewing these provisions as 
conflicting, they should be interpreted harmoniously where possible, particularly 
given that these are both parts of the same treaty and that the Agreement on 
Safeguards constitutes an elaboration of GATT Article XIX.174 This is consistent with 
Footnote 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, which specifically states that ‘Nothing in 
this Agreement prejudges the interpretation of the relationship between Article XIX 
and paragraph 8 of Article XXIV of GATT 1994’. It is also consistent with the 
general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31(1) of the VCLT, which requires a 
treaty to be interpreted ‘in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose’.175 On this reading, Article 2.2 need not override Article XXIV:5 and Article 
XXIV:8; read together, Article XXIV:5 of the GATT 1994 provides an exception to 
the MFN rule in Article 2.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards (with the words ‘this 
Agreement’ in Article XXIV:5 referring to the WTO treaty as a whole, rather than just 
the GATT 176
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The drafting history of Article XXIV (which may be referred to pursuant to Article 32 
of the VCLT) confirms the inapplicability of the first approach, given that the debate 
about the relationship between Articles XIX and XXIV centred on the second two 
approaches, and whether RTA partners either ‘need not’ or ‘should not’ apply 
safeguards to each other’s imports.177 The drafting history also indicates that Article 
XIX was deliberately omitted from the list of exceptions.178 Although Article XXI 
(security exceptions) is similarly omitted from the list of exceptions in parentheses, 
this omission is also arguably explained by the drafting history.179 
Turning then to the second approach, requiring RTA partners to exempt each other 
from global safeguards may be consistent with the MFN rule in Article 2.2 of the 
Agreement on Safeguards. However, it is inconsistent with the language of Article 
XXIV:8. Even assuming that safeguards constitute ORRC and that the exceptions 
listed in parentheses in Article XXIV:8 comprise an exhaustive list (as suggested 
above), flexibility remains inherent in Article XXIV:8 because the obligation on RTA 
partners is simply to eliminate duties and ORRC on substantially all the relevant trade 
rather than on all the trade. The Panel in Argentina – Footwear (EC) and a number of 
commentators have reached a similar conclusion.180 
The first two approaches also seem inconsistent with the purpose of RTAs as 
expressed in Article XXIV:4. If RTA partners must impose global safeguards on each 
other’s imports, this is consistent with Article 2.2 and will reduce trade distortion and 
diversion in accordance with Article XXIV:5, but it will restrict intra-RTA trade 
contrary to the principle behind Article XXIV:8, defeating the purpose of allowing 
RTAs in the first place. At the same time, requiring RTA partners to impose global 
safeguards on each other may contravene Article 41(1)(b)(ii) of the VCLT, since it 
derogates from the purpose of the WTO agreements of promoting trade liberalisation 
as a means to improving global welfare. Conversely, if RTA partners must not impose 
global safeguards on each other’s imports, this will have a positive impact on intra-
RTA trade liberalisation in accordance with Article XXIV:8 of the GATT 1994, but it 
will necessarily create trade distortion and diversion of trade away from WTO 
Members not party to the relevant RTA, contrary to the principle behind Article 
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XXIV:5 of the GATT 1994, Article 2.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards, and Article 
41(1)(b)(i) of the VCLT.  
The third approach, in contrast, leaves flexibility to RTA partners and charges them 
with the responsibility of ensuring compliance with the letter and spirit of the WTO 
rules. In particular, in accordance with GATT Article XXIV:5 and VCLT Article 
41(1)(b)(i), RTA partners need to minimise the impact on other WTO Members of 
excluding each other from global safeguards, should they choose to do so. At the 
same time, pursuant to GATT Article XXIV:8 and VCLT Article 41(1)(b)(ii), RTA 
partners need to ensure sufficient intra-RTA trade liberalisation should they decide to 
impose global safeguards on each other.  
This approach does not necessarily render the list of exceptions in Article XXIV:8 
redundant, as argued by Estrella and Horlick.181 Rather, provisions falling within that 
list may be maintained as long as they are ‘necessary’ (as stated in Article XXIV:8), 
whereas duties and other ORRC not falling within that list must be eliminated on 
substantially all the trade. It is true that this means that the WTO-consistency of the 
RTA could vary from time to time,182 but that is the case with respect to any RTA 
anyway. Assessing consistency with Article XXIV:8 is a difficult task requiring 
substantial evidence and fact collection because ‘the entire gamut of duties and other 
regulations of commerce must be examined’,183 and ‘the examination of individual 
measures, regulations, products covered and trade flows affected may be required’.184 
Under this third approach, safeguards are assessed along with all the other remaining 
restrictive trade measures, given that maintaining either will have similar trade 
effects.185 The Appellate Body’s decision in Turkey – Textiles also does not preclude 
this third approach. As explained elsewhere, the Appellate Body’s ‘timing’ and 
‘necessity’ requirements should be read as applying (if at all) 186  only to Article 
XXIV:5 (external trade) and not to Article XXIV:8 (internal trade).187 
                                                 
181 Angela Gobbi Estrella and Gary Horlick, ‘Mandatory Abolition of Anti-dumping, Countervailing 
Duties and Safeguards in Customs Unions and Free-Trade Areas Constituted Between World Trade 
Organization Members: Revisiting a Long-standing Discussion in Light of the Appellate Body’s 
Turkey-Textiles Ruling’ (2006) 40(5) Journal of World Trade 909, 932. 
182 See Nicolas Lockhart and Andrew Mitchell, ‘Regional Trade Agreements under GATT 1994: An 
Exception and its Limits’ in Andrew Mitchell (ed), Challenges and Prospects for the WTO (Cameron 
May: London, 2005) 217, 239; James Mathis, ‘Regional Trade Agreements and Domestic Regulation: 
What Reach for “Other Restrictive Regulations of Commerce”?’ in Lorand Bartels and Federico Ortino 
(eds), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2006) 
79, 89. 
183 Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Comment: Nothing dramatic (… regarding administration of customs laws)’ 
(2009) 8(1) World Trade Review 45, 47, referring to Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Textiles. See 
also WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Systemic Issues Related to Other Regulations of 
Commerce: Background Note by the Secretariat – Revision, WT/REG/W/17/Rev.1 (5 February 1998), 
[17]. 
184 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994, [2]. 
185 See Alan Sykes, The WTO Agreement on Safeguards: A Commentary (Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, 2006) 232. 
186 See the critique in Joost Pauwelyn, ‘The Puzzle of WTO Safeguards and Regional Trade 
Agreements’ (2004) 7(1) Journal of International Economic Law 109, 132-135. 
187 Panel Report, US – Line Pipe, [7.148], n 137 (the Appellate Body declared these findings moot 
and of no legal effect: Appellate Body Report, US – Line Pipe, [199]); Nicolas Lockhart and Andrew 
Mitchell, ‘Regional Trade Agreements under GATT 1994: An Exception and its Limits’ in Andrew 
Mitchell (ed), Challenges and Prospects for the WTO (Cameron May: London, 2005) 217, 226-228; Cf 
 
34 TANIA VOON 
My assessment of the three approaches with respect to the purpose of RTAs is 
summarised in the table below. 
 
Approach to global safeguards among RTA parties Negative trade impact Must impose Must not impose May impose 
External: trade distortion 
and diversion away from 
non-RTA WTO Members 
Low High 
Low  
(RTA parties to ensure 
compliance with  
GATT Art XXIV:5 and 
VCLT Art 41(1)(b)(i)) 
Internal: trade restrictions 
on RTA parties High Low 
Low  
(RTA parties to ensure 
compliance with  
GATT Art XXIV:8 and 
VCLT Art 41(1)(b)(ii)) 
 
(iv) Eliminating Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures 
Like Article XIX, Article VI of the GATT 1994 is not included in the list of 
exceptions in Article XXIV:8. However, as anti-dumping and countervailing 
measures are not imposed on an MFN basis,188 many of the difficulties associated 
with analysing safeguards in RTAs do not arise. In particular, the potential conflict 
between the MFN provision in Article 2.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards and the 
exception in GATT Article XXIV disappears in the context of anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures. Nevertheless, agreeing not to impose anti-dumping or 
countervailing measures on RTA partners would probably violate the general MFN 
rule in GATT Article I:1, and so such an RTA would still need to rely on the 
exception in Article XXIV. 
In interpreting the meaning of Article XXIV for such an RTA, the option of requiring 
RTA partners to actually impose anti-dumping and countervailing measures on each 
other makes little sense, since all WTO Members are free not to impose any such 
measures or not to impose them on imports from particular countries. This leaves the 
options of requiring RTA partners to eliminate anti-dumping and countervailing 
measures, or permitting RTA partners to apply these measures. In 1994, Gabrielle 
Marceau called for the elimination of anti-dumping duties within free-trade areas.189  
A free-trade area where anti-dumping duties are phased out appears to be the minimum 
level integration necessary for a successful trade deal. … This crucial legal step, phasing 
out of internal anti-dumping duties, will further integration and push free-trade areas closer 
to customs union. This would explain why free-trade areas, imperfect customs unions, were 
accepted: they can effectively lead to further integration. Regional and multilateral trade 
can therefore be reconciled with GATT. 
                                                                                                                                            
Alan Sykes, The WTO Agreement on Safeguards: A Commentary (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 
2006) 235-236. 
188 See above sections IIIB(i) and IIIB(ii). 
189 Gabrielle Marceau, Anti-Dumping and Anti-Trust Issues in Free-trade Areas (Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, 1994) 187-192. See also Michael Hart, ‘Introduction’ in Michael Hart (ed), Finding 
Middle Ground: Reforming the Antidumping Laws in North America (Ottawa, Centre for Trade Policy 
and Law, 1997) 1, 15. 
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The benefits of excluding RTA partners from anti-dumping and countervailing 
measures are clear, given their doubtful economic foundations.190 However, keeping 
in mind the potential problem of such exclusion leading to greater imposition of anti-
dumping and countervailing measures on other WTO Members,191 and the flexibility 
inherent in Article XXIV:8, 192  I conclude that RTA partners have the same 
obligations with respect to anti-dumping and countervailing measures as they do with 
respect to safeguards: namely, they are entitled to impose them on each other 
provided that they ensure compliance with Article XXIV:5 and XXIV:8 of the GATT 
1994, and Article 41(1)(b) of the VCLT. 
                                                
One possible contrary argument is that anti-dumping and countervailing measures are 
not ORRCs at all, and therefore RTA partners have no obligation to reduce them 
pursuant to Article XXIV:8. This argument is premised on the assumption that anti-
dumping and countervailing measures are designed to offset unfair trading practices 
of other Members (in the form of dumping or subsidisation) and thus do not represent 
restrictive measures of the imposing Member. However, even accepting this 
assumption, it does not explain why provisions such as GATT Article XX (General 
Exceptions) are included in the Article XXIV:8 list, when measures falling under 
Article XX are also aimed at specific legitimate purposes and therefore justified 
derogations from other WTO provisions. If exceptions to WTO rules were not 
intended to fall within the description of ORRCs, the drafters need not have included 
GATT Article XX in the list of provisions in Article XXIV:8. 
C Compliance with the Enabling Clause 
Paragraph 2(c) of the Enabling Clause applies the exemption from MFN treatment in 
paragraph 1 to: 
Regional or global arrangements entered into amongst developing country Members for the 
mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and, in accordance with criteria or conditions 
which may be prescribed by the Ministerial Conference, for the mutual reduction or 
elimination of non-tariff measures, on products imported from one another … 
This provision may be seen as equivalent to GATT Article XXIV in the context of 
RTAs among developing country Members. Additional conditions on these RTAs are 
found in paragraph 3 of the Enabling Clause, which provides that ‘differential and 
more favourable treatment’ provided under the Enabling Clause: 
(a) shall be designed to facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries and not 
to raise barriers to or create undue difficulties for the trade of any other contracting 
parties; 
(b) shall not constitute an impediment to the reduction or elimination of tariffs and other 
restrictions to trade on a most-favoured-nation basis … 
These conditions reflect concerns similar to those encompassed in Article XXIV:5 
and XXIV:8 of the GATT 1994193 and Article 41(1)(b) of the VCLT, and the above 
 
190 See above section IIB(i). 
191 See above sections IIIB(i) and IIIB(ii). 
192 See above n 180 and corresponding text. 
193 Cf David Gantz, Regional Trade Agreements: Law, Policy and Practice (Durham, North Carolina: 
Carolina Academic Press, 2009) 43. 
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analysis in relation to the three types of trade remedies apply equally to RTAs among 
developing country Members. Requiring these RTA partners to impose safeguards 
against each other would be contrary to the purpose of promoting the trade of 
developing countries as set out in paragraph 3(a) of the Enabling Clause, and 
requiring them to impose anti-dumping or countervailing measures is contrary to the 
non-MFN basis on which they are imposed in any case. Requiring them to eliminate 
trade remedies against each other could raise barriers to non-RTA partners, 
particularly through trade diversion arising from global safeguards applied on a 
discriminatory basis, contrary to paragraph 3(a) and 3(b). An approach that grants 
RTA partners flexibility in choosing whether to impose particular trade remedies 
against each other properly places the onus on the relevant Members to maintain 
compliance with the Enabling Clause. 
V CONCLUSION 
This paper aims to contribute towards a reduction in the use of trade remedies among 
WTO Members for the benefit of all WTO Members and the global economy as a 
whole. It does so by taking advantage of the multiplicity of RTAs and their capacity 
to influence trade-related conduct and beliefs. This issue deserves further scholarly 
attention, especially from a legal and economic perspective and drawing on the wealth 
of raw material available in the context of RTAs.  
A few existing RTAs as identified in this paper demonstrate that some WTO 
Members may be willing to restrict various forms of trade remedies amongst 
themselves, and that this is a feasible and realistic approach, even in the absence of 
deep integration between the RTA parties. The above analysis of WTO rules 
concerning trade remedies in RTAs shows that RTA partners are permitted to exclude 
the application of anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard measures among 
themselves, provided that they continue to limit negative trade impacts on non-RTA 
WTO Members in accordance with Article XXIV:5 of the GATT 1994, Article 
41(1)(b)(i) of the VCLT, and paragraph 3(a) and 3(b) of the Enabling Clause. Doing 
so will further the underlying objectives of allowing RTAs in the WTO and increase 
intra-RTA trade liberalisation in accordance with GATT Article XXIV:8, VCLT 
Article 41(1)(b)(ii), and Enabling Clause paragraph 3(a). This reading should assist in 
increasing certainty about the interaction between RTAs and trade remedies with the 
goal of encouraging existing RTA parties to amend their agreements and future RTA 
parties to abolish or at least restrict trade remedies among themselves. This would be 
one step towards limiting trade remedies among WTO Members and, ultimately, 
replacing anti-dumping measures with competition disciplines, countervailing 
measures with WTO dispute settlement, and safeguards with a reformed regime. 
 
 TANIA VOON 37 
VI ANNEX 1: WTO-EQUIVALENT RTAS 
This Annex categorises 118 RTAs that do not change WTO trade remedy rules or make only 
minor modifications to those rules. 
The following Category 1 RTAs do not mention WTO trade remedies or make no significant 
change to the relevant WTO provisions: 
 
1. Agreement on Foundation of Eurasian 
Economic Community (Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Russian 
Federation, Tajikistan) 
2. Armenia – Kazakhstan 
3. Armenia – Moldova 
4. Armenia – Russian Federation 
5. Armenia – Turkmenistan 
6. Armenia – Ukraine 
7. Australia – Chile  
8. Commonwealth of Independent States 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, 
Russian Federation, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan; not 
yet ratified by all parties) 
9. EC – Egypt 
10. Faroe Islands – Switzerland 
11. Georgia – Armenia 
12. Georgia – Azerbaijan  
13. Georgia – Kazakhstan 
14. Georgia – Russian Federation 
15. Georgia – Turkmenistan 
16. Georgia – Ukraine 
17. Kyrgyz Republic – Armenia 
18. Kyrgyz Republic – Kazakhstan 
19. Kyrgyz Republic – Moldova 
20. Kyrgyz Republic – Russian Federation 
21. Kyrgyz Republic – Ukraine 
22. Kyrgyz Republic – Uzbekistan 
23. Melanesian Spearhead Group Trade 
Agreement (Papua New Guinea, 
Solomon Islands, Vanuatu) 
24. Southern African Development 
Community (Botswana, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe; Angola and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo still to join) 
25. The Unified Economic Agreement 
Between the Countries of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates) 
 
The following Category 2 RTAs allow for the imposition of bilateral safeguards without 
otherwise changing WTO trade remedy rules: 
 
1. Albania – Bosnia Herzegovina 
2. Albania – Bulgaria 
3. Albania – FYROM 
4. Albania – Moldova 
5. Albania – Serbia & Montenegro 
6. Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement 
(Bangladesh, China, India, Laos, 
Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka)  
7. Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(‘ASEAN’: Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Vietnam) – China 
8. ASEAN – Republic of Korea 
9. Bulgaria – Bosnia Herzegovina 
10. Chile – China 
11. Chile – India 
12. Chile – Japan 
13. Chile – Republic of Korea  
14. China – Pakistan  
15. Croatia – Albania 
16. EC – Mexico 
17. EC – South Africa 
18. EC – Turkey Customs Union 
19. India – Afghanistan  
20. India – MERCOSUR  
21. India – Sri Lanka 
22. Japan – ASEAN  
23. Japan – Malaysia 
24. Japan – Mexico  
25. Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership Agreement (Brunei 
Darussalam, Chile, NZ, Singapore)  
26. US – Chile 
27. US – Morocco 
28. US – Oman 
 
 
38 TANIA VOON 
The following Category 3 RTAs make procedural changes to the application of trade 
remedies under WTO rules and provide additional rules for the application of bilateral 
safeguards: 
 
1. Albania – Kosovo  
2. Albania – Romania 
3. ASEAN 
4. Bulgaria – Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (‘FYROM’) 
5. Bulgaria – Israel 
6. Bulgaria – Serbia & Montenegro 
7. Canada – Costa Rica 
8. Central European Free Trade Agreement 
(Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak 
Republic) 
9. Chile – Costa Rica 
10. Chile – El Salvador 
11. Croatia – Bosnia Herzegovina 
12. Croatia – FYROM 
13. Croatia – Serbia & Montenegro 
14. East African Community (Kenya, 
Uganda, Tanzania) 
15. EC – Algeria 
16. EC – Bulgaria 
17. EC – FYROM 
18. EC – Iceland 
19. EC – Israel 
20. EC – Jordan 
21. EC – Lebanon 
22. EC – Morocco 
23. EC – Norway 
24. EC – Palestine Liberation Organization 
(‘PLO’) 
25. EC – Romania 
26. EC – Syria 
27. EC – Switzerland and Liechtenstein 
28. EC – Tunisia 
29. Economic Cooperation Organisation 
Trade Agreement (Afghanistan, 
Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) 
30. European Free Trade Association 
(‘EFTA’) – Bulgaria 
31. EFTA – Canada  
32. EFTA – Croatia  
33. EFTA – Israel 
34. EFTA – Jordan 
35. EFTA – Lebanon  
36. EFTA – Macedonia  
37. EFTA – Mexico 
38. EFTA – Morocco 
39. EFTA – Palestinian Authority 
40. EFTA – Romania 
41. EFTA – Tunisia 
42. EFTA – Turkey 
43. Faroe Islands – Iceland 
44. Faroe Islands – Norway 
45. FYROM – Bosnia Herzegovina 
46. Israel – Turkey 
47. Japan – Singapore 
48. Moldova – Bosnia Herzegovina 
49. Moldova – Bulgaria 
50. Moldova – Croatia 
51. Moldova – FYROM 
52. Moldova – Serbia & Montenegro 
53. Romania – Bosnia Herzegovina 
54. Romania – FYROM 
55. Romania – Israel 
56. Romania – Moldova 
57. Romania – Serbia & Montenegro 
58. Romania – Turkey 
59. South Asian Free Trade Area 
(Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, 
Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka) 
60. Turkey – Bosnia Herzegovina 
61. Turkey – Bulgaria 
62. Turkey – Croatia 
63. Turkey – FYROM 
64. Turkey – Morocco 
65. Turkey – PLO 
66. Turkey – Tunisia 
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VII ANNEX 2: WTO-PLUS RTAS 
The following RTAs restrict the application of these trade remedies between RTA partners: 
Anti-dumping measures# Countervailing measures# Global safeguards 
1. ANZ Protocol 
2. Canada – Chile 
3. China – Hong Kong 
4. China – Macau 
5. EC 
6. EFTA 
7. EFTA – Chile 
8. EFTA – Singapore  
1. China – Hong Kong 
2. China – Macau 
3. EC 
4. EFTA 
1. Andean Community 
(Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru) 
2. ANZ Protocol* 
3. Australia – Thailand 
4. Canada – Chile  
5. Canada – Colombia 
6. Canada – Israel 
7. EC – Chile Interim 
Agreement 
8. EC* 
9. Israel – Mexico 
10. MERCOSUR* 
11. NAFTA 
12. NZ – China 
13. NZ – Singapore* 
14. NZ – Thailand 
15. Panama – Costa Rica 
16. Panama – El Salvador 
17. Panama – Taiwan 
18. Singapore – Australia* 
19. Singapore – India 
20. Singapore – Jordan 
21. Singapore – Panama 
22. US – Australia 
23. US – Central America 
and Dominican 
Republic 
24. US – Colombia  
25. US – Israel  
26. US – Jordan 
27. US – Panama  
28. US – Peru 
29. US – Republic of 
Korea 
30. US – Singapore 
 
#Anti-dumping and countervailing measures are also excluded under the EEA in most sectors. See 
above nn 86, 100. 
*These RTAs preclude both global and bilateral safeguards between the RTA partners. 
 
